THE COMMANDER'S SWORD & THE EXECUTIVE'S PEN: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS IN CONGRESS AND THE USE OF FORCE

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Post-force congressional rally effects are presented as a new incentive behind presidential decisions to use diversionary behavior. Using all key roll call votes in the House and Senate where the president has taken a position for the years 1948 to 1993, presidents are found to receive sharp decreases in both presidential support and success in Congress shortly after employing aggressive policies abroad. Evidence does suggest that presidents are able to capitalize on higher levels of congressional support for their policy preferences on votes pertaining to foreign or defense matters after uses of force abroad. But, despite these findings, diversionary behavior is found to hinder rather than facilitate troubled presidents' abilities to influence congressional voting behavior.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the publication of Stoll's (1987) seminal piece "The Sounds of the Guns: Is there a Congressional Rally Effect after U.S. Military Actions?" his findings that Congress does rally for presidents on key international votes after the use of force have been widely cited and embraced by the diversionary literature. However, while the use of force research stemming from the work of Ostrom and Job (1986) has evolved into a sophisticated research program generating a voluminous amount of scholarship, very little research has been done to further examine the domestic effects that occur directly after the initiation of force. The goal of this thesis is to help fill the looming gap in the use of force literature by examining two research questions, *How does initiating a use of force abroad affect presidents' abilities to obtain support for their legislative positions in Congress? And, do, as Ostrom and Job (1986) contend, U.S. Presidents use their constitutionally assigned powers as Commander-in-Chief to translate directly into greater personal and political success in their roles as Chief-Executive and party leader?*

Examining whether or not presidents directly capitalize on the use of force in Congress is important for two reasons. First, presidents' decisions to use force have direct implications on U.S. foreign policy and their constituents. For this reason, it is important to know whether presidents choose to use force because it is best for their country or for their own personal motives. In the U.S. foreign policy literature, a growing amount of work has been done trying to link U.S. foreign policy decisions to

domestic political and economic factors instead of international variables.[1] The crux of this literature's argument is that presidents actively pursue policies in areas in which they have greater control and authority (foreign policy and the military) in order to better their political standings at home. While critics have strongly questioned the diversionary literature's findings from the prospective of presidential opportunities and willingness, [2] Stoll's (1987) findings of congressional rally effects deserves a further, more extensive, examination. Confirmation of repeatable congressional rallies across issue areas and during the *bad times* would provide clear and direct evidence for the incentives behind a president's choice to instigate a diversionary use of force. A strong showing of military leadership may be converted into enough political capital for a politically ailing president to resurrect his image as a leader in the eyes of the general public and the government.

Another reason to examine whether members of Congress do rally after uses of force centers on the interrelationship between presidents and Congress on policy formation. Within the domestic arena, presidents must actively promote and garner legislative victories in order to maintain the public's perception of competent leadership (Neustadt 1960, Richards et. al. 1993). However, in the Congress literature, a large body of work has focused on the powerful role that internal membership forces, like party identification, ambition for re-election, and constituent preferences, play in shaping

[1] To see examples looking at the effects of unemployment and inflation see Ostrom and Job (1986), DeRouen (1995, 2000), and Fordham (1998). For examples of uses of force due to low or dropping presidential approval ratings see Ostrom and Job (1986), Marra et al. (1990), James and Oneal (1991), and Morgan and Bickers (1992).

[2] For criticism of the diversionary use of force see Meernik (1994), Meernik and Waterman (1996), and Lian and Oneal (1993).

their legislative decisions; leaving presidents only a small amount of room to exert influence.[3]

Out of this Congress centered approach, the presence of rally effects directly after uses of force undermine some of the central assertions derived from past research. Congressional rally effects offer the possibility for members of the opposition party to actually improve sitting presidents' standings by lending their support to legislation that presidents wish to stop or move through Congress. This runs contrary to the main party identification thesis. Problems also arise when accounting for the basis of the diversionary uses of force. From this theory, presidents are expected to use force abroad as a way of managing their individual problems at home. However, it is at the times when presidents are most vulnerable that the Congress centered thesis argues that troubled presidents will be most hindered in their attempts to engender member support (e.g. Rudolph 2003; Samuels 2004). Further research needs to be done in order to determine whether presidents should expect greater support after initiating uses of force, and do presidents use these expected boosts to their own political benefit. Positive findings for greater presidential success would provide additional support for a large body of the diversionary literature; while, contemporaneously, contradicting a large body of literature centered on Congress.

This study will seek to address both issues spelled out above, while distinguishing itself from the previous literature. Employing all uses of force initiated by the United States, I analyze the impact of international conflict on congressional voting

[3] See, for example, Fiorina (1977), Kingdom (1981), and Aldrich (1995). Exceptions to this literature have focused on the importance of presidential approval on member behavior. Bond and Fleisher (1990) and Edwards (1980), for example, have found evidence that popular presidents are better able to acquire deference from members of Congress for their policy positions.

behavior for every key roll call vote in the House and Senate where the president has taken a position from 1948 to 1993 (Stoll 2006). Specifically, I examine whether presidents are more likely to find greater support and success for their positions in Congress from the chamber as a whole, members of the opposition, and their own party after initiating uses of force abroad. I also test whether presidents can directly benefit from using force during times of economic and political trouble; times when other widely used theories would argue that members should be most divisive.

In the next chapter, I review the major theoretical arguments of diversionary theory and evaluate the theoretical basis for the two main incentives used to explain why presidents would be more willing to use force abroad. Section three represents the theoretical portion of the paper where I use previous research to develop the expected relationship that links political uses of force with congressional membership voting behavior. Following this discussion, I test hypotheses, derived in Chapter Three, with multiple statistical models, to be outlined in Chapter Four. The results and analyses of these models are then reported in Chapter Five. In final, I summarize the major findings drawn from the paper, ending with some concluding remarks on potential avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The notion that U.S. presidents may use international crises in order to improve their domestic standings represents an interesting twist in the use of force literature. Impetus of much of this research comes from Ostrom and Job's (1986) classic article, "The President and the Political Use of Force." Using a cybernetic decision model, they argue that in order for U.S. presidents to maintain their roles as Chief-Executive, Commander in Chief, and political leader they must incorporate information from the "…salient dimensions in the domestic, international, and political arenas" into their foreign policy decision-making (1986 pp.555). The authors find that domestic factors involving presidential approval ratings and presidential success have stronger correlations with the use of force than international factors. Their findings also offer the first empirical evidence that presidents may choose to initiate acts of force abroad in response to troubled times at home.[4] Scholarly works from James and Oneal (1991) and DeRouen (1995 & 2000) have also found strong connections between fluctuations in presidential approval ratings and likelihood of the use of force.[5]

Other scholars have employed a more refined approach to diversionary theory. Morgan and Bickers (1992) find evidence that presidents are more likely to use diversionary behavior in-order to rally dwindling support from within their own parties. Such findings are consistent with that of public opinion research that has founds that

[4] Ironically, they also find that presidents are more likely to use force when their public approval rating is high. The coefficient for this variable is larger than that of the other domestic variables, and is found to be just as significant.

[5] These studies differ some on their unit of analysis. Ostrom and Job (1986) and James and Oneal (1991) look at fluctuations in the presidents public approval ratings as a whole, while Morgan and Bickers (1992) look at the effect of falling approval ratings within the presidents own party. DeRouen (2000) does not look at when force is most likely, but instead is focusing on what level of force should be expected based on the presidents' approval ratings at home.

individuals already predisposed to a president, such as his co-partisans, are the most likely to rally to his support during times of crisis (e.g. Tami and Swenson 1997). But, a recent reassessment of Morgan and Bickers' (1992) findings by Foster and Palmer (2006) has challenged their central hypothesis. Using an extended data set of US conflicts, as well as more sophisticated methodological techniques, Foster and Palmer find that presidents are more likely to respond to declines in overall approval; reaffirming findings from above.

Studies by Ostrom and Job (1987), James and Oneal (1991) and Wang (1996) have also found strong correlations between U.S. economic performance and the likelihood that presidents will use force.[6] Using an economic misery index that accounts for the effect of inflation, unemployment, and issue salience among the public, all three works find that presidents are more likely to use force during times of economic turmoil. In later work, Fordham (1998a; 1998b) disaggregates the weighted misery index into separate unemployment and inflation rate variables to measure economic performance. Looking at uses of force from 1949-1994, he finds that unemployment has played a significant role in predicting when presidents will choose to use force (1998a). Fordham (1998b) then explores the relationship between presidential party affiliations and responses to different economic indicators. Examining presidential decision-making across administrations, he finds that Republican presidents are more likely to use force during times of high employment, while Democrats are more likely to use force at time of high inflation. These findings were later re-tested and re-affirmed by Clark (2003).

[6] DeRouen (1995), not mentioned above, also finds links between the misery index and use of force, but only indirectly through affects on presidential approval ratings.

Despite the cumulating evidence of diversionary behavior, strong criticisms have been made on the influences domestic factors have on uses of force abroad. Both Meernik (1994) and Meernik and Waterman (1996) argue that much of the diversionary literature is guilty of selection bias; causing previous findings to only appear significant. By changing the unit of analysis to the *opportunities* to use force, instead of when force actually occurs, they argue that it provides a greater understanding of how and when domestic factors influence presidential decisions to use force. After accounting for these missing observations, they both find that none of the domestic factors linked to uses of force above are found to be significant, contrary to the findings to the diversionary literature.

While the narrative of a politically ailing president using force abroad to manipulate his standings at home is appealing at a theatrical level, the evidence presented above only represents a portion of the whole story. In fact, the majority of the diversionary literature has presented the tale of presidential subterfuges in foreign policy *in medias res;*[7] with little evidence or examination of what came before or directly after the decision to use force. This presents a clear problem with the current literature, because, as Meernik (1994) points out at the end of his piece, "We need to *begin* by identifying the domestic and international costs and benefits of using force in order to explain *why* Presidents use force" (902).[8] Though Ostrom and Jobs' (1986) observations are correct in pointing out that the multi-faceted roles of US presidents offer them the unique position to pursue diversionary behavior, the same multi-faceted

[7] The term "*in medias res"* is a literary term used to describe a specific oratory and writing style where the author begins a story in the middle of the sequence of events that make-up the narrative. Actions that occur prior to the story's begin scenes are typically revealed as the plot progresses.
[8] Emphasis in original.

role offers modern presidents a plethora of other viable policy options at the same time (see Most and Starr, 1984). Because the diversionary literature focuses, almost entirely, on when presidents are most likely to use force, it has failed to account for the future benefits that have been assumed to make presidents more willing to pursue diversionary behavior. Until we have gained a greater understanding of the expected post-use of force domestic effects, we should seriously question the theoretical rationale behind why a politically ailing president would be more willing to instigate the use of force over other possible actions.

2.1 Post-Force Effects-Public Approval and Domestic Factors

The most widely used variant of diversionary theory posits that when presidents have fallen under 'hard times' at home, they will resort to using military force abroad in order to manipulate public opinion into their corners. As DeRouen (2000) points out, "Implicit in the diversionary theory is a *short-term* boost in presidential approval known as the rally effect" (317).[9] Relating back to the previous section, this expected rally effect represents the primary future benefits that presidents wish to receive by undertaking diversionary behavior. However, even though a great deal of work has focused on examining the influence of domestic factors on U.S. foreign policy, post-force domestic benefits have been typically represented as a given. Since these post-force benefits represent the major theoretical justifications behind diversionary behavior, this assumption may be premature. A review of the relevant literature provides contradictory findings, and, when considering diversionary behavior, it calls into question whether rally effects should be considered as reified post-force phenomena.

[9] Emphasis mine.

The theoretical foundations that make-up the common theory presented in much of the diversionary literature can be attributed to the work of past studies in sociology and psychology looking at internal group behavior. From theses studies (see Simmel 1955; Coser 1956) scholars have found evidence that the perceived presence of a shared common enemy increases a group's cohesion. Though these studies only looked at group behavior on a small scale, many of the same characteristics and findings have been found to be applicable to the populations of states. Within the use of force literature, Mueller (1973) was the first to operationalize and directly study the relationship between presidential approval ratings and uses of force. His findings show that presidents tend to receive an ephemeral positive post-use of force jump in popularity before eventually declining to pre-force levels.[10] This natural group formation stands as the cornerstone upon which much of the diversionary literature predicts that presidents will choose to use force abroad in order to improve their situation at home.

However, recent findings on U.S. public opinion have found that the posited determined relationship between the use of force abroad and higher levels of approval are much more complicated than diversionary theory suggests. Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) find that the U.S. public is "pretty prudent" on how it responds to different policies promoted abroad. Missions involving humanitarian interventions and checks on foreign acts of aggression are found to have much higher levels -double digit differences- of public support than missions involving regime change and state-building exercises.[11] These findings show that public opinion can show both positive and negative approval for the same issue depending on the mission's

[10] Subsequent works by Lee (1977) and Huckley (1988) have confirmed these findings.
[11] See, for example, Oneal, Lian, and Joyner (1996). They find that the American public has been consistently supportive of the use of military force against foreign acts of aggression from 1950-1988.

objectives. Findings by Nincic (1997) also provide evidence that public opinion on foreign policy issues can vary across specific demographics. Different factors, like inflation and unemployment, affect different sectors of the public unequally; presenting the possibility that a specific portion of the country's population may choose to either support or oppose certain foreign policy issues based solely on the domestic and political environment unique to that time.[12] Such predictable variations in support lend further credence to evidence showing (see Hurtwitz and Peffley 1987) that public opinion concerning foreign affairs is structured and greatly resistant to outside manipulation. All together, these findings show that presidents must account for a greater range of domestic and political factors when dealing with the public; making it much harder for them to manipulate public support as theorized.

Despite the difficulty of predicting public reaction, diversionary scholars have found evidence that uses of force -even during tumultuous times- do lead to rallies in public approval for presidents. Marra et al. (1990) find that both major and minor uses of force in major areas of the world can lead to boosts in approval by 5.40 and 1.08 points, respectively. They also find that the coefficient on their foreign environment variable has the largest effect on public opinion out of the four variables that are under presidential control. DeRouen (1995; 2000) uses a simultaneous system of equations model to analyze the indirect effects of domestic economic variables on presidential approval as well as the initiation of a militarized disputes. He finds a recursive linkage between public approval and uses of force where low approval ratings lead to conflicts of higher intensity which then lead to rises in overall approval (1995 pp 687-689). Later,

[12] This line of thinking fits with Fordham's (1998b) and Clark's (2003) findings of partisan differences and uses of force.

DeRouen (2000) finds that both initiation of force and level of force significantly affect presidential approval.

Critics of diversionary theory have countered supportive findings with public opinion and presidential approval evidence of their own. Brody and Shapiro (1989) find in their study of 45 situations where an expected rally event should occur that the president's approval ratings actually went down 20% of the time. Lian and Oneal (1993) look at public opinion, presidential popularity, and uses of force by the United States from 1950 through 1984. From their model they find that the mean improvement in presidential popularity after a crisis and use of force comes out to be 0. They also find that the uses of force that receive the most public exposure in the media tend to increase the presidents' approval ratings *only* by 2-3 points. This lends considerable doubt to the assumed benefit that presidents are expecting to receive by using force abroad. DeRouen and Peake (2002) obtain similar findings when they test the president's ability to change the overall agenda of the U.S. public. Using vector autoregression (VAR), they find that the impact of uses of force do not effect presidential approval beyond the 95% degree of confidence barrier. But, they found presidents to be able to divert the public's attention away from possible domestic problems for up-to four months.[13]

Going by the evidence presented in the literature, whether or not presidents receive the rally effects that many diversionary scholars expect is still inconclusive. From the evidence, presidents should expect a possible rally of public approval after a

[13] This ability may fit well with Fordham's (1998a) assertion that diversionary behavior may be a way of approval stabilization. While the president's approval rate does not go up, it does remain stable after the public attention is diverted. It is impossible to know whether the president's approval rating would have continued to go down or stabilized if he had not used force abroad.

use of force. However, whether such a rally will be large enough to save them from their political problems is anyone's guess. This problem cuts to the heart of one of the main incentives used to justify the diversionary narrative. If presidents are unable to really benefit from the uses of force, then they should not be expected to expend limited resources to pay for expensive military actions at a dire hour in their presidencies. In order to justify the inherent costs of using force abroad, a clearer and more visible form of incentive must be found.

2.2 Policy Constraints and Diversionary Behavior

A second, less common, incentive presented in the diversionary literature posits that state leaders are more likely to use force abroad in order to display or re-affirm their positions of leadership at home. Such explanations have steered away from the use of post-force "rallies" as the sole justification for leadership decision-making while incorporating more of an institutional element into their theoretical narrative. For example, Richards et. al. (1993) pose that state leaders are more likely to divert the public's attention in order to further establish records of competent leadership. The perception of competent leadership is assumed to be highly salient to the public's decision to retain leaders; providing more of a long-term benefit than any ephemeral rally-around-the-flag effects that may occur. Diversionary behavior serves as a way that state leaders are able manipulate the institutional mechanisms that determine whether they will remain in their positions of authority.

Other scholars have argued that diversionary behavior is a means by which state leaders can act when otherwise constrained from pursuing other viable policy options (see Most and Starr 1984). Fitting this explanation, state leaders have been found to be

more likely to use force when other policy options are institutionally blocked or are unavailable to be implemented at their discretion (e.g. Morgan and Bicker 1992; Miller 1995; Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002; Brulé 2006). This represents a clear shift from previous scholarship that emphasized rally effects as the main incentive for state leaders to divert the public's attention. The over reliance on such an incentive-based explanation has relegated diversionary behavior as a symptom of democratic politics. Autocratic leaders, whose political authority and power does not emanate from the general population, do not have the same need to maintain their public's approval. Such leaders have the option to utilize more coercive means at their disposal to remain in power (see,e.g, Bueno de Mesquita 1980; Davenport 1994,1999; Davies 2002). However, all state leaders, democratic or not, are susceptible to some form of policy constraints, offering a common incentive for state leaders to use diversionary behavior across all regime types.

Out of this re-conceptualization of leadership decision-making, multiple cross-national studies have been performed to determine whether diversionary behavior is a generalizable phenomena among all, or a select subset, states within the international system (e.g. Gelpi 1997; Leeds and Davis 1997; Dassel and Reinhardt 1999; Miller 1995; 1999; Davies 2002). The overall findings for these cross-national studies are mixed. Some scholars (see, Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002) contend that the diversionary thesis is only relevant when discussing leadership decision-making for well-established democracies.[14] States where the political leaderships are most constrained in what

[14]In their study of 18 advanced industrialized democracies, Leeds and Davis (1997) find no support for a relationship between political constraints and international behavior. They also find that politically constrained leaders are less likely to receive international demands. The authors argue that these findings present evidence of strategic behavior by external actors to avoid the higher possibility of conflict

policies they are able to pursue. Work by Miller (1996, 1999) presents evidence of the exact opposite relationship. He finds that autocratic states are more likely to act aggressively abroad during times of economic and political vulnerability than democratic states.

One argument put forward to explain contradictory findings across democratic states involves institutional variations that present different forms of institutional constraints on the executive, there by generating differences in conflict behavior. Some scholars (see e.g. Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003; see also Clark and Norstrom 2005) have argued that regimes where actors, other than the chief executive, play a definitive role in shaping the state's foreign policy are much less likely to initiate foreign conflicts and wars. To this effect, Auerswald (2000) posits that presidents have greater freedom to direct and act on foreign policy matters than their parliamentary system counterparts who must directly rely on membership support. Therefore, presidential systems, including the US, should be more likely to use force abroad. However, multiple empirical tests conducted do not bare this relationship out (Reiter and Tilman 2002; Clark and Norstrom 2005). In the case of the US, empirical evidence has found that the presence of divided government and a strong congressional opposition in-directly constrains presidents' international behavior by providing possible post-force costs that limit president abilities to pursue their legislative agendas (see, Clark 2000; Howell and Pevehouse 2005).

The separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative Branches causes presidents to be highly susceptible to institutional constraints due to their limited

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with vulnerable leaders. Similar strategic target avoidance arguments have also been made by Smith (1996) and Clark (2002).

abilities to unilaterally implement domestic policies. Brulé (2006) argues that presidents facing a divided Congress and a unified opposition are much more constrained in their abilities to pass policies that would address domestic economic troubles.[15] Accounting for interaction effects, he finds that presidents facing economic troubles at home are much more likely to use force abroad when constrained by strong congressional opposition versus times of unified, consensual, government. Such evidence displays the importance of considering other institutions, especially Congress, when developing theories involving leadership decision-making and the diversionary use of force.

2.3 Congressional Decision-making and Uses of Force

One avenue in dire need of further study is what direct effects uses of force abroad have on congressional voting behavior, and whether such impacts represent an incentive for presidents to employ diversionary behavior. In a widely cited article, Stoll (1987) finds evidence that members of Congress are more likely to support the president's position on key-international votes directly after foreign military actions.[16] He attributes these repeating boosts in congressional support to two distinct influences: constituents' opinions and congressional rally effects.

Through the first influence, Stoll argues that the surges in public opinion predicted to occur directly after the initiation of force affect the level of support members of Congress will grant presidents. "…[S]ince the general public will rise to support the president, any opposition by a member of Congress will be at odds with the feelings of

[15] See, for example, Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards and Barrett 2000.

[16] Looking at "Internationalism" in Congress, Meernik and Oldmixon (2004) also find evidence that uses of force abroad increase the likelihood that presidents will be successful at promoting their international policies in Congress. In both the House and Senate, the number of militarized disputes observed in the previous month significantly increased the probability that presidents' international policies would be supported by each chamber of Congress.

her or his constituents," says Stoll (225). Essentially, this represents an extension and indirect by-product of the rally-around-the-flag effects predicted within much of the diversionary literature. Failure by members to show support for a popular president during times of crisis may result in their constituents seeking retribution in the future. These assertions match well with those found in the Congress literature that finds that high and surging levels of public approval can, essentially, be traded for political capital in Congress (see, e.g., River and Rose 1985; Light 1999).

The second - more interesting - influence that Stoll links to congressional behavior after uses of force comes from rallies that occur among member of Congress. He astutely points out that just because members of Congress are elected officials, it does not mean that they are immune to displaying the same rally behavior that has been observed from the general public. Presented with an international crisis, members would be subject to the same psychological in-group/out-group forces addressed by the public opinion literature cited above. The perceived presence of a common external enemy, presented by the use of force, predicts that there will be greater cohesion within Congress. This greater cohesion translates into congressional rallies similar to those found by previous research in the public sphere.[17] However, while public rally effects can only be detected through increases in presidential approval, rallying members of Congress are able to show higher levels of support for presidents through their legislative voting decisions. As a result, Stoll finds that presidents' positions on key international votes are more likely to be supported directly after uses of force abroad.

[17] See, for example, Mueller (1973), Lee (1977) and Huckley (1988).

While the arguments presented by Stoll are compelling, we should not rush too quickly to the impression that changes in congressional voting behavior represents a clear incentive for presidents to use diversionary behavior. An essential part of the diversionary narrative entails that presidents undergo diversionary behavior in order to save their administrations from domestic troubles. Unfortunately, Stoll's (1987) piece fails to account or control for any of the domestic factors, unemployment, inflation rate, and public approval, which have been associated with either helping or hindering presidents' abilities to effectively pursue their legislative agendas.[18] At present, the evidence that is presented by Stoll is only able to give the reader a narrow view of what kind of behavior presidents should expect from Congress after the use of force.

Another point of concern is Stoll's self-imposed limitation of only looking at congressional behavior in regards to key international votes. When deriving his hypotheses for his model, he justifies this limitation by arguing that it would be very hard for either influence to be linked to other domestic issues. However, within the diversionary literature, much of diversionary behavior's appeal centers on presidents being able to use their international actions to engender positive domestic effects. From the diversionary theorist perspective, the presence of one or both of these influences presents the possibility that members of Congress will show greater support to presidents across all policy areas. This would allow presidents to use aggressive foreign policy in order to improve their leadership positions through both international and domestic key votes. Evidence of this would suggest that manipulating

[18] Meernik and Oldmixon (2004) do account for domestic variables such as presidential popularity, unemployment, and inflation in their model. While these control variables (except for presidential popularity) are found to be significant and going in the appropriate direction, the number of militarized disputes in the previous month is still found to be a statistically positive predictor of presidential success on international votes in Congress.

congressional behavior does represent clear incentives for presidents to use diversionary behavior.

From this review, we see evidence showing that domestic factors, in some way, are related to presidential decisions to use force. However, exactly what is driving presidents to rely on diversionary behavior remains murky. In the following sections, I will try to relieve these deficiencies. First, I use existing theories found in the literature to develop a generalizable theoretical relationship between the initiation of a violent interstate conflict and congressional voting behavior that provide incentives for presidents to act aggressively abroad. Then, I examine whether presidents are better able to promote their policy positions in Congress after initiating force abroad. Affirmative evidence that uses of force lead to greater presidential support and success in Congress provides clear incentives for why presidents would undergo diversionary behavior. It also allows me to begin to determine whether presidents who choose to use the US's military might in order to personally benefit from their decisions.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Since the work of Ostom and Job (1986) over twenty years ago, diversionary theorists have clearly scripted the storyline of a politically ailing president using force abroad to improve his position at home. This theoretical tale has been told and re-told so many times in the literature that the basic under-lying narrative does not need to be re-addressed here. Instead, I intend to build off of previous research that has examined the role of policy/institutional constraints on leaders' decisions to use force abroad (see, e.g. Morgan and Bicker 1992; Richard et. al. 1993; Davies 2002; Brulé 2006) by shifting the focus of this study to the post-force effects that occur within Congress -the primary institutional constraint of the Executive Branch- and their possible impact on presidential decision-making. By re-focusing the unit of analysis away from measures of presidential approval to key roll call votes in Congress, I distinguish myself from past research by presenting a clear new incentive for why presidents would be willing to undergo diversionary behavior –to obtain greater presidential support and success in Congress.

3.1 Presidential Interests and Decision-Making

All presidents are political animals who possess specific goals that they wish to obtain during their tenure in office. Research on the presidency has broken-down these presidential goals into three distinct ambitions: winning reelection, implementing favorable policies, and securing their presidential legacy (Light 1999). Though separate, in many ways these three goals are intrinsically intertwined. For example, in order for presidents to be reelected they must first promote and help enact policies that

will cause their constituents to look back positively on their first term of office; thus retaining their leadership for a second term (see, e.g. Fiorina 1981; Richards et, al, 1993). As pointed out by Ostrom and Job (1986), presidents, from their positions of authority, fill multiple roles within the government as Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief, and party leader. Each of these leadership roles presents presidents with unique opportunities to actively pursue their vested interests.

One area of chief interest to modern presidents is the maintenance of their public approval ratings. Crespi (1980) and Hodgson (1980) argue that presidential approval ratings have come to serve as a pseudo-confidence vote among the public concerning the president's ability to effectively govern. For presidents, such ratings can be used as a source of congressional influence or contention depending on their popularity. Popular presidents are significantly more likely to influence members' voting behavior as well as present bold legislative agendas to Congress (Rivers and Rose 1985; Brace and Hinckley 1992; also see Light 1999).

The strongest determinant of presidential popularity has been found to be the public perception of the president's stewardship of the nation's economy (e.g. Nincci and Hinckley 1991). Those presidents that are perceived to be effective managers, as well as those that have served during times of economic expansion, are much more likely to be reelected (Erikson 1989; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). Such electoral incentives insure that, during times of economic trouble, presidents are compelled to act or face greater public scrutiny of their leadership abilities (Richards et. al. 1993).

> Managing the economy, for example, requires the president to exert substantial influence over the Congress whose "power of the purse" grants them jurisdiction over the major components of fiscal policy. Similarly, domestic program innovation demands that considerable time and resources be directed towards Capitol Hill (Light 1982). In general, these tasks require a legislative strategy and the consent of Congress. (Marra et. al 1990 pp 591)

Unfortunately, presidents' reliance on Congress severely limits exactly what policy initiatives they are able to implement. Such limitations leave presidents vulnerable to public discontent when they are in greatest need of legislative influence.

It is in such dire situations that presidents are found to use alternate means at their disposal to shape domestic policies (see e.g., DeRouen and Heo 2000; Mayer 2001). Such actions lay at the heart of diversionary theory, where presidents, constrained in what actions they are able take, are predicted to be more likely to use force abroad (see e.g. Morgan and Bicker 1992; Miller 1995; Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002; Brulé 2006). While the common conceptualizations of diversionary theory would posit that presidents choose to use force to garner rally effects among the domestic public or as a means of displaying their prowess as leaders, presidents are, here, assumed to pursue policy options that are at their disposal to seek external –international- solutions to their domestic problems. Presidents are assumed to use force abroad in order to obtain greater support for their policy positions in Congress[19], there-by loosening the constraints on their abilities to act in the future. Congressional rallies of support are

[19] This line of reasoning represents an expansion on previous predictions by Stoll (1987) and Meernik and Oldmixon (2004) that Congress is more likely to vote in favor of international legislation directly after uses of force abroad.

linked to multiple influences originating from both in and outside of Congress; leaving open the possibility for strategically minded presidents a wider array of opportunities to manipulate members of Congress to their own ends.

3.2 Congressional Interests and Voting Behavior

Much like their presidential counterparts, members of Congress are goal oriented individuals who wish to remain in office (Feno 1973; Mayhew 1974). To meet this goal, members must pay careful attention to the opinions and view points expressed by their constituents back home. Mayhew (1974) finds that the primary reason that constituents vote for specific members is because they believe that they share similar preferences in regards to partisan ideology and policy. Thus, members must act in ways that show that they are not "out of step" with their core base of support. Members must shift their positions with shifts in public opinion or the make-up of their constituencies (e.g. Bartels 1991; see also Jones and McDermott 2004). Otherwise, they may be subject to greater public scrutiny come reelection time.

One of the strongest determinants of members' voting behavior comes from their partisan identification (see e.g., Fiorina 1977; Kingdom 1981; Aldrich 1995). Political parties present members and their constituents with the ability to quickly identify individuals with similar policy preferences. This easy and reliable identification method allows members to collaborate together in order to formulate and pass legislation that meets their shared political preferences.[20] Similarly, members of the same party as the president are much more likely to support his policy preferences when it comes time to

[20] Aldrich (1995) argues that lack of political parties in the first two Congresses resulted in clear social choice problems. Stable coalitions of independent voters were very hard to maintain causing very little legislation to be passed. The formation of political parties presented a solution to the stability crises by presenting members of Congress with clear distinguishable organizations of like-minded members.

vote, while members of the opposing party, who possess their own preferences and party loyalties, are much more likely to voice opposition to the president's positions (e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989). This divisive partisan relationship between Congress and the presidency has been found to be especially strong when the control of both braches is divided along partisan lines. During these times of divided government, members of the majority party in Congress will actively oppose the sitting president's policies (see e.g., Fiorina 1996; Binder 1999; Krause 2000). [21] In some cases, members may intentionally oppose presidential policy proposals, even to the detriment of their own constituents, in order to engender discontent among the public towards the president's inability to address their problems (Mayhew 1974 pp. 29-30).

Members must also be attentive to their constituents' opinions concerning presidential job performance. Studies of changes in the partisan-composition of Congress (e.g. Fiorina 1981; Marra and Ostrom 1989) have found links between presidential popularity and partisan-composition of Congress. Members belonging to the same party as the sitting president can be more or less likely to be reelected depending on the administration popularity among the general public (see e.g., Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Campbell 1993; Jacobson 1997; see also, Fiorina 1983; Stein 1990). The presidential 'coat-tails' effect can vary significantly by how much co-partisan members vote along or against unpopular presidents' policies. Members that are able to distance themselves by voting against presidential policies or pursuing their own counter-legislative agendas are more likely to be viewed favorably by their

[21] For an opposing view, see Mayhew (1994). Edward, Barrett, and Peake (1997) find that more significant legislation fails during times of divided government versus unified government. But, at the same time, no significant relationship between divided government and how much significant legislation presidents support and get passed through Congress.

constituents than those that simply defer to presidential proposals (Brady, Canes-Wrone, and Cogan 2000; Brady et. al. 1996; also see Gronke et. al. 2003; Jones and McDermott 2004). Such actions represent strategic decision-making on the part of members of Congress in order to maximize their approval levels in the eyes of their constituents.

3.3 US Foreign Policy, Uses of Force, and Congressional Responses

Normally, administrations serving during times of divided government and strong congressional opposition are less likely to use force abroad. These findings have been indirectly linked to the negative post-force effects presidents would incur from a, then, hostile opposition Congress (see Schultz 1998; Clark 2000; Howell and Pevehouse 2005). However, it is during times of trouble, when presidents are expected to have the least influence in Congress and the least congressional support for their policies, that they are predicted to be the most likely to employ aggressive foreign policies (e.g. Morgan and Bicker 1992; Miller 1995; 1997; Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002). In fact, Brulé (2006) argues that if the risks of negative congressional post-force actions are less than the possible benefits of a foreign policy success, presidents will look abroad for their own political answers.

In order to best assure that they obtain benefits from the international arena, presidents must actively pursue more than just new policies abroad. Presidential actions abroad must be able to garner the public's attention and support, while also remaining viable policy options that can be utilized when most needed. To sufficiently meet both of these requirements, presidents wield their country's foreign policy apparatuses to act as the aggressors abroad. Assertively pursuing the US's interests,

presidents are able to respond to domestic troubles at home by initiating conflicts with other external actors. They are also able to draw the public's attention by initiating conflicts abroad in which the US eventually uses violent force. Violent international crises, as described, have repeatedly been found to lead displays of support and minor boosts in presidential approval among the general public (see Marra et. al 1990; Oneal Lian and Joyner 1996). When confronted with these diversionary presidential actions, how are members of Congress expected to respond?

Congressional scholars have long pointed out that the dual roles constitutionally assigned to presidents have given them greater influence in Congress on matters of foreign policy and defense (Wildavsky 1966; Fleisher and Bond 1988). But, faced with such a visible action of presidential leadership and power as the use of force abroad, members of Congress must form some kind of coherent response in return.[22] Meernik (1995) finds that one of the strongest determinants of whether or not members of Congress vote to enact the War Powers Resolution or other legislation to curtail military actions abroad is public opinion. After uses of force, members will look to how their constituents respond for cues on how they themselves should react to the president's actions. The presence or expectation of possible rally effects among members' constituents (Mueller. 1973, Lee. 1977, and Huckley. 1988) should directly influence their behavior in regards to the president as well (see e.g. Bartels 1991; see also Jones and McDermott 2004). While members' constituents can openly declare their support for the president in many different ways, the clearest way that individual members can

[22] Even though the traditional responsibilities of foreign policy have fallen on the shoulders of the president, Lindsay and Ripley (1992) stress that since the 70's Congress has actively tried to reassert itself into U.S defense and foreign policy formation. Meernik (1993) finds evidence that Congress dramatically changed its voting behavior in concern to matters of defense and foreign policy after the Vietnam War.

echo such support is through their ability to vote on up-coming legislation. Failure to account for such reversals in presidential standings or openly opposing highly popular presidents can cause members to face long-term problems from the public in reaching their goal of re-election. In order to avoid such political career ending set-backs, members of Congress are expected, on average, to parallel their constituents' reactions by showing higher levels of support for presidents' policies shortly after uses of force abroad.

Beyond shifts in their constituents' opinions, members of Congress are also able to show rallies of support for presidential actions. From the previous section, Stoll's (1987) findings that members of Congress show higher levels of support for presidents on key international votes shortly after uses of force abroad, provides some initial evidence for the presence of congressional rallies. Essentially, Stoll bases his arguments on the same assumptions on group behavior made within the diversionary literature.[23] Members of Congress are not so different from the general public that we should expect that they will not encounter the same inner-group forces that lead to rushes of patriotism felt by average citizens.

Apparent asymmetrical differences in information between presidents and Congress during international crises also increase the likelihood of congressional rallies. Because much of the information that members receive about crises comes from departments under the authority of the president, it would be difficult for members of Congress to quickly obtain enough information to justify openly opposing a president's foreign initiatives (Brody, 1983. cited by Stoll, 1987 pp. 225, see also Schlesinger 1989; Meernik 1995). Evidence has also shown that individuals who have a greater

[23] See, Marra et. al (1990) & DeRouen (2000).

awareness of the initiation of force are more likely to rally in response (Edwards & Swenson 1997).[24] Because members of Congress are government officials, some sitting on congressional committees dealing specifically with international and military affairs, they are more likely to be aware of the policies being instituted by the government.

These post-force effects present the constraints of congressional decision-making and voting behavior in a new light. While normally members are expected to be less likely, especially across party lines, to follow the lead of a politically ailing president, the presence of congressional rally effects would insure membership solidarity. Much like the greater group cohesion predicted by Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956) in the past, strong partisan influences on members' decision-making are expected to briefly diminish. At the same time, members in greater numbers are expected to temporarily direct their support to the president as the head of their new unified front. Thus, we should expect members to be more disposed to presidential influences, directly translating into higher levels of congressional support and greater presidential success in Congress.

3.4 Hypotheses

Congressional Rallies. Working from the previous observations that members of groups that face a common enemy experience greater group cohesion[25], I argue that members of Congress, should, for a period of time, rally to the President's side after the use of force.[26] From their unique position as elected legislators within the United States government, members of Congress are uniquely able to display their feelings of

[24] Though minute, similar evidence has been found by Lian and Oneal (1993)
[25] See, for example, Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956).
[26] See, for example, Stoll (1987); Meernik and Oldmixon (2004). Also see Muller (1973).

solidarity behind the president by affording him greater amounts of congressional support on legislation. These effects should be found shortly after the initial use of force, and then are expected to quickly deteriorate as other domestic and foreign matters become salient to both the general public and to Congress. Thus, I expect a positive relationship between uses of force and congressional support for the president's policy positions. I also expect that the impact of force on members' voting behavior is temporary, and diminishes over time.

H1a: Members of Congress will demonstrate greater support for the president's policy positions on key roll call votes shortly after the initiation of a use of force abroad.

H1b: Presidents are more likely to be successful in getting their policy positions passed through Congress shortly after the initiation of a use of force abroad.

H2a: Members of Congress, after initial rallies, will demonstrate less support for the president's policy positions on key roll call votes over time.

H2b: Presidents, after initial rallies, are less likely to be successful in getting their policy positions passed through Congress on key roll call votes over time.

Partisan Behavior. One of the strongest indicators found within the congressional literature of determining how members will decide on key roll call votes is their party identification (see. Fiorina 1977; Kingdom 1981; Aldrich 1995). However, I argue that in the wake of a use of force abroad, members of Congress, as predicted in the rally-

around-the-flag literature, will respond with greater group cohesion. Perceiving a common external enemy, members will be more likely to work together to support the president in order to maintain the appearance of group solidarity. Thus, we should expect a positive relationship between uses of force and support for the president's policy position from the congressional membership of both the president's party and the opposition. We should also expect that the impact of uses of force on each group's membership should be temporary, and that its impact should diminish over time.

H3a: Members of Congress belonging to the president's party will demonstrate greater support for the president's policy positions on key roll call votes shortly after the initiation of a use of force abroad.

H3b: Members of Congress belonging to the opposition party to the president will demonstrate greater support for the president's policy positions on key roll call votes shortly after the initiation of a use of force abroad.

H4a: Members of Congress belonging to the president's party, after initial rallies, will demonstrate less support for the president's policy positions on key roll call votes over time.

H4b: Members of Congress belonging to the opposition party to the president, after initial rallies, will demonstrate less support for the president's policy positions on key roll call votes over time.

Presidential Authority. Within the congressional literature, scholars have found some evidence that presidents' constitutionally assigned roles as head of the state's military and chief diplomat have given them greater authority to direct and influence

policies that fall under their scope of power, such as matters of foreign policy and defense.[27] The effects of this asymmetrical influence would even be more pronounced shortly after the use of force where international issues were involved, and the executive is in control of the major information collecting bodies within the federal government (Stoll 1987; see also Meernik and Oldmixon 2004). At these times, members of Congress will be dependent on the Executive branch to supply them with information in order to make their decisions. This places the president at a distinct advantage in promoting their policies, which makes it more likely that members will defer to the president's judgment. Therefore, presidents should be expected to have a greater ability to exert their influence on Congress after a use of force in areas where they have greater Constitutional authority, specifically legislation concerning foreign policy and defense.

> *H5a: Members of Congress will demonstrate greater support for the president's policy positions on key roll call votes involving the military and foreign affairs than other policy areas (e.g. Domestic and Political) after the initiation of a use of force abroad.* [28]
>
> *H5b: Presidents are more likely to be successful in getting their policy positions passed on key votes involving the military and foreign affairs than other policy areas (e.g. Domestic and Political) after the initiation of a use of force abroad.*
>
> *H6a: Members of Congress belonging to the president's party will demonstrate greater support for the president's policy positions on key*

[27] See, for example, Wildavsky (1966) and Fleisher and Bond (1988)
[28] Policy Area for key roll call vote has been coded by Stoll (2006) as being Domestic, Political, Foreign, or Military.

roll call votes involving the military and foreign affairs than other policy areas (e.g. Domestic and Political) after the initiation of a uses of force abroad.

H6b: Members of Congress belonging to the opposition party to the president will demonstrate greater support for the president's policy positions on key roll call votes involving the military and foreign affairs than other policy areas (e.g. Domestic and Political) after uses of force abroad.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

The principle focus of this thesis is the examination of how presidential decisions to initiate violent interstate conflicts (i.e. the initiation of a use of force abroad) impact members' of Congress voting behavior. Specifically, I intend to use the theory offered in the previous section to develop a congressional behavior model that allows me to test my derived hypotheses. Evidence showing that presidents receive higher levels of presidential support and success from members of Congress after the initiation of a use of force abroad represents a powerful incentive for struggling presidents to choose diversionary behavior. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, I define presidential support in Congress to be the percentage of members in each chamber of Congress that defer to the president's position on a key roll call vote. Likewise, I define presidential success to be the probability that a president's policy position is followed by each Chamber.

4.1 Measuring the Dependent Variables

From the above definitions of congressional support and success, I am able to construct multiple dependent variables that are uniquely able to test the predictions laid out by my theory. The principle data for measuring congressional support and success comes from Stoll's (2006) congressional vote data set. In this data set, Stoll codes every key roll call vote identified by *Congressional Quarterly* editors[29] in both the House

[29] *Congressional Quarterly* editors select key votes concerning major issues for each year. "An issue is judged to be a key vote by the extent to which it represents:

- a matter of major controversy
- a matter of presidential or political power
- a matter of potentially great impact on the nation and lives of Americans" (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 2001 pp. C-3).

and Senate for the years 1945-1993.[30] I have chosen to use Stoll's congressional data for two distinct reasons. First, during times of political and economic trouble, presidents will need to be able to pass significant legislation in order to address domestic problems. Since key votes are designated based on matters of "presidential power" and their possible "impact" on the public (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 2001 pp. C-3), Stoll's data allows me to determine whether congressional rallies serve as a possible incentive for presidents to use diversionary behavior in order to obtain greater support on salient votes. It also allows me to analyze whether uses of force abroad affect members' voting behavior on issues that have been deemed important. Previous scholarship posits that members' voting decisions are primarily determined by electoral and partisan forces.[31] But, Stoll's data provides a means of determining whether other external forces -like strategically minded presidents- are able to influence members' behavior more than previously thought.

To generate my dependent variables to measure presidential support in Congress, my unit of analysis is every key roll call vote where the president has taken a position from 1948-1993. For each individual vote, I calculate a presidential support score that represents the percentage of the entire chamber that deferred to the president's position. I do this by summing the total number of members that deferred to the president's position ($S_{i,c}$) for each individual key roll call vote (subscript *i*) from the chamber as a whole (subscript *c*). I then divide that sum by the total number of members in the chamber that have taken a position, represented by $(S_{i,c} + \sim S_{i,c})$.

[30] Due to missing data for the years 1945, 1946, and 1947, only key roll call votes during the years 1948-1993 are analyzed.
[31] See, for example, Mayhew (1974) and Aldrich (1994).

Where ($\sim S_{i,c}$) represents the total number of members that did not defer to the president's position.

$$(1) \quad \Pr esidentialSupport_{ic} = \frac{S_{ic}}{(S_{ic} + \sim S_{ic})} * 100$$

This calculation generates a variable that varies continuously from a low of 0 to a max of 100 with a one unit increase representing a one percent increase in presidential support from the chamber. This allows me to determine what factors, including the use of force abroad, influence the amount of support Congress extends to presidents on key roll call votes.

Because some scholars (e.g. Morgan and Bickers 1992; Foster and Palmer 2006) have argued that diversionary behavior is meant to bolster lagging support within the president's own party, two additional dependent variables are created in order to analyze fluctuations in presidential support in the House and Senate across party identification. Much like the first dependent variable, a presidential support score is calculated for each key roll call vote. However, instead of comparing the total sum of all members that support the president's position against the chamber as a whole (subscript "c"), support scores are calculated to determine the percentage of members of the president's party (subscript "p") and the percentage of members belonging to the opposition party (subscript "o") have deferred to the president's position.

$$(2) \quad \Pr esidentialSupport_{ip} = \frac{S_{ip}}{(S_{ip} + \sim S_{ip})} * 100$$

$$(3) \quad \Pr esidentialSupport_{io} = \frac{S_{io}}{(S_{io} + \sim S_{io})} * 100$$

If congressional rallies do occur, these variables provide us with a greater knowledge of who lends greater support to presidents after uses of force. It also allows us to determine whether uses of force abroad have a unifying or polarizing impact on members' decision-making.

Higher levels of presidential support do not always translate into presidents getting their policy preferences through Congress. Also, presidents do not need to receive higher levels of support to get their agendas realized. They only need to procure enough member support to insure that their position will pass. To test whether uses of force abroad lead to congressional rallies that increase the likelihood that presidents are able to get their policy preferences through Congress, I use the chamber as a whole support scores discussed above to create a dichotomous dependent variable measuring presidential success. Presidential success is coded as (1) for each key roll call vote where the chamber as a whole demonstrates presidential support that exceeds 50% -a simple majority-, and coded as (0) otherwise. Because rallies are thought to lead to greater feelings of unity, I create an additional dichotomous variable to test the likelihood that presidents are able to obtain bi-partisan support for their policy preferences. Bi-partisan support is coded as a (1) for each key roll call vote where simple majorities -greater than 50%- are observed to support the president by both members of the president's party and among members of the opposition party. All observations that fail to meet this simple dual-majority threshold are coded as (0). Together, these new dichotomous variables are able to provide valuable information that is crucial to fully testing my theory. While the three previous dependent variables help shed light on how much support presidents should expect, presidential success

and bi-partisan support allow us to assess how congressional responses to uses of force abroad impact the outcomes of key legislation. Such information goes directly to determining whether presidents are able to use their positions as Commander in Chief to translate into personal political and domestic benefits.

4.2 Measuring the Independent Variables

The Use of Force Abroad

In order to accurately model the influences that aggressive foreign policies have on members of Congress, two specific factors must be accounted for: when has the US initiated uses of force abroad and what key roll call votes may be affected by them. To measure these two factors I use all US initiated militarized interstate disputes (MID) where the US used force abroad[32] from 1948 to 1993 as recorded in the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (version 3.02).[33] Because the principle aim of this thesis is to examine the domestic effects that occur after US initiated militarized actions, other widely used data sets that include observations on possible opportunities to use force would not be appropriate. I generate my sample of US initiated uses of force by determining whether the US initiated the dispute (*SideA*), and whether the corresponding hostility level variable (*HostLev*) for the US scores a four and above on level of force used.[34] This sample of US initiated uses of force will give me the temporal

[32] Clear distinctions need to be made between all US uses of force and the specific selection of cases that is being used in this thesis. Only US uses of force during the years 1948 to 1993 where the US has been coded as the dyadic initiator of the conflict are being employed. All remaining US uses of force have been excluded. This selection procedure provides me the opportunity to test how members of Congress respond when it is the US that is the aggressor abroad, rather than analyzing how members respond to the use of force abroad in general.

[33] MID data set can be obtained from http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. Coding and data collection procedures are discussed in Gochman and Maoz (1984) and Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996).

[34] From 1948 to 1993, the US has initiated 77 MID's. Of those MID's, the US used force, designated as a 4 and above on the disputes *HostLev* variable, 32 separate times. These 32 MID's represent my sample of US initiated uses of force abroad.

reference points needed to account for any impact that initiated uses of force may have on congressional support and presidential success over time through my dependent variables. Three temporal variables are created representing key roll call votes that take place within 1-30, 31-60, and 61-90 days after the initiation of a use of force abroad.[35] Each temporal dummy variable is coded as (1) if an initiated use of force took place within a designated number of days before a key roll call vote, and (0) otherwise.[36] Together, these temporal dummy variables are used to gauge the impacts of a recently initiated use(s) of force on the level of legislative support and legislative success Congress affords presidents.

Other Independent Variables

In order to construct a model of congressional voting behavior, specific domestic factors found within the literature to influence members' voting decisions must also be considered. Research into public opinion has shown that foreign policy matters greatly influence how the public supports the president, but the most influential factor remains to be the public's perceived health of the economy.[37] Because strong links have been found between members' voting behavior and their constituents' opinions (Mayhew 1974; Feno 1978), and presidential approval has been found to affect presidents' abilities to promote their policy positions in Congress (Neustadt 1960, Rivers and Rose, 1985, and Edwards 1989), variables controlling for monthly unemployment[38], inflation[39],

[35] For a similar use of temporal dummy variables, consult Stoll (1987).
[36] Summarizing my temporal dummy variables, 30 key roll call votes in the House and 22 votes in the Senate have been coded as occurring within 30 days of an initiated use of force, 16 votes in the House and 22 votes in the Senate have been coded as occurring within 31-60 days of an initiated use of force, and 23 votes in the House and 32 votes in the Senate have been coded as occurring within 61-90 days of an initiated use of force.
[37] See, for example, Nincic and Hinckley (1991).
[38] Data on monthly unemployment levels come from the Department of Labour Statistics webpage: http://stats.bls.gov/top20.htm.

and presidential approval[40] are included in the model. All three variables have been lagged by one month in order to insure that they impact the dependent variable instead of the other way around.

Additional evidence has also been found linking presidential success in Congress to the partisan composition of both chambers (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989). We should expect that presidents who face Congresses made-up of more members of their party to receive greater levels of support, on average, than that of presidents having to work with fewer co-partisan members. Therefore, I include a variable accounting for the total number of members of the president's party in each chamber to control for both members' and presidents' partisan identifications.[41] Higher numbers of co-partisan members of Congress are expected to be associated with higher levels of overall presidential support and legislative success.[42]

Beyond party identification, members also rely on their own ideological predispositions to determine how they will position themselves on certain votes. For this reason, different Congresses possessing similar partisan make-ups can display considerably different voting records in comparison depending on the ideological leanings of their members. Because liberal ideology is often associated with expanding

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[39] CPI and inflation data can be downloaded from the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis webpage: http://www.bea.doc.gove/.

[40] Monthly presidential approval data can be obtained from the Gallup organization website: http://www.gallup.com.

[41] Annual data on the percentage of members of the president's party in each chamber comes from Eric Reinhardt's United States Congressional Party Discipline (USAPDISC) data set, which can be found on his website at: http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/data/index.html

[42] Evidence from the Congressional literature (see Binder 1999; Krause 2000) would also have us suspect that the presence of divided government would also impact the amount of support and success presidents' should expect from Congress. To account for the effects of partisan incongruence between the president and Congress, I created a dummy variable coded as (1) for each year that divided government is observed, (0) otherwise. Tests for multicollinearity find that the presence of divided government is highly correlated with that of the percent of the president's party in congress variables, p=.7. Use of the divided government dummy variable is found to yield similar results as my baseline model specification that includes the percent of the president's party in congress variable.

the role of government to meet constituent interests, higher measures of liberalism are expected to lead to a more diverse set of policy preferences among members of Congress. The presence of a wider diversity of policy preferences are predicted to makes it much harder for coalitions of support for the president to be formed. I control for variations in membership ideological composition by including a composite liberalism score generated by Americans for Democratic Actions (ADA) measuring annual ideology, specifically liberalism, within Congress. These scores have been adjusted for inflation by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) to better facilitate comparisons across time and chamber.[43]

An additional consideration must be made for the theoretical significance behind the "timing" of votes and presidential influence. In some ways, greater experience does more to hinder presidents' abilities to influence members of Congress than help. The longer presidents are in office the more negative information the public and members of Congress are able to collect in order to form their assessments of presidential performance. Such assessments help members determine whether to defer to presidents' policy positions or not. For this reason, Congressional scholars (e.g. Lockerbie, Borrelli, and Hedger 1998) predict that presidential success, on average, to steadily decline for each year of an administration's tenure. I control for such patterns of congressional support by including a variable that counts the number of years in office, at that time, for each president. Presidents have been found to receive short drops in congressional support during election years. Much of this work argues that strategically minded members propose legalization that will attract favor from their base

[43] Inflation adjusted ADA scores can be obtained by contacting the authors, Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999).

constituents, there-by undermining more nationalist policies proposed by presidents. Members also have an incentive to show greater independence come election times in order to avoid any possible negative coat-tail effects that may occur (Brady, Canes-Wrone, and Cogan 2000; Brady et. al. 1996). To account for these expected drops in support, I include a dummy variable coded as (1) for every year that a congressional election is held, (0) otherwise.

My final control variable is used to account for possible variations in presidential powers and influence across different policy areas. As pointed out in the previous section, congressional scholars have long held that presidential powers provide them with greater influence on matters concerning US foreign policy and defense.[44] To control for this additional influence, I include a dummy variable coded as (1) for all key roll call votes concerning foreign and defense issues, while votes on domestic and political issues are coded as (0). Beyond performing as a simple control in the base models, this variable plays a critical role in testing hypotheses 9-10 in later, expanded, models. There, I interact my foreign/defense dummy variable with my three use of force variables. Through this procedure, I am able to hash out possible differences in membership voting behavior for foreign and defense votes occurring directly after uses of force abroad vs. votes concerning domestic and political issues occurring directly after uses of force abroad.

4.3 Methods Discussion

To fully test the hypotheses derived above, I employ multiple statistical techniques in three distinct stages of analysis. In the first and most basic stage, I analyze the data's summary statistics in order to develop a fuller understanding of

[44] For examples, see, Wildavsky (1966) and Fleisher and Bond (1988).

member decision-making in regards to presidential support and success at the aggregate level. Specific points of interest include the mean levels of support and probabilities of success presidents receive from members of Congress. I then use simple cross-tabs analysis to examine how presidential support is distributed across both chambers. In effect, the goal of this stage of analysis is to use summaries of the dependent variables to observe possible patterns and trends that are already apparent within the data. With such knowledge, we are then better able to move on to stages two and three where more sophisticated multivariate statistical techniques are utilized.

The next two stages of analyses use the dependent variables outlined above and presented in Table 1.1 to individually examine how uses of force affect the amount of legislative support and success presidents receive from Congress, as per my derived hypotheses. To accomplish this task, specific multivariate statistical techniques are used in accordance with the requirements for each dependent variable. Stage two primarily examines what factors determine the amount of member support presidents should, on average, receive for their policy positions. From my discussion above, the generation process for the three dependent variables measuring presidential support (support from the chamber as a whole, president's party, and opposition party) create variables that vary continuously from 0 to 100. The continuous nature of the dependent variables leaves open the possibility of using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Even though all three variables are limited from 0 to 100, OLS regression is still an appropriate method for obtaining parameter estimates if each model's residuals are normally distributed (Gujerati 2004 pp. 337-339). However, after multiple tests, I have determined that my data violates OLS regression's key assumption of normality,

making it an inappropriate estimation technique.[45] In the end, I have chosen to use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) as my main method of analysis. Presidential support is tested with Stata 9.0 statistical software package using a general linear model for a gamma distributed dependent variable and an identity link. Such an estimation technique automatically provides me with the marginal effects of my MLE models, allowing me to interpret how a one unit change in my independent variables produces a β unit change in the dependent variable (*S*tataCorp 2005).

For the final stage of analysis, I focus on how different factors, specifically uses of force abroad, impact presidential success in Congress. To test for my hypothesized relationships, I use the two remaining dependent variables that account for whether or not presidents obtain a simple majority as well as bipartisan support for their positions in Congress. The dichotomous nature of these dependent variables causes simple OLS regression and other estimation techniques that model continuous variables to be inappropriate. In order to best model the expected outcomes, while utilizing widely known statistical techniques[46], I run MLE probit, models to analyze my data. The fairly large N samples being used for both the House and Senate chambers (358 and 330 observations respectively), insures that MLE's asymptotic properties will obtain unbiased and efficient parameter estimates for my model (Greene 2000 pp.126-127). Probit models also allow me to easily calculate the marginal effects associated with each independent variable, which provides the impact that my exogenous variables

[45]To test whether each of the three support variable's residuals are distributed normally, all three variables were ran using OLS regression with the baseline model specification outlined below. The residuals for all twelve models –six for the House and six for the Senate- were then tested using Shapiro-Wilk W tests for normally distributed data (StataCorp 2005). In all twelve cases I was easily able to reject the null that the model's residuals *are* normally distributed. Results for all twelve normality tests can be found in Table 6, Appendix B.

[46] See, for example, Aldrich and Nelson (1984), Stoll (1987), Meernik (1993), and Meernik and Oldmixon (2004).

have on the probability that presidents' positions are followed while holding all else constant at their mean (StataCorp 2005).

For both stages 2 ad 3, the two statistical methods outlined above are employed to test my baseline model specification. This baseline specification is represented as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathrm{Y}_{i,x,t} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1(\mathrm{Pr}esidentialPopularity_{i,x,t-1}) + \beta_2(Unemployment_{i,x,t-1}) + \beta_3(Infaltion_{i,x,t-1}) + \\
& \beta_4(\%\mathrm{Pr}esident'sParty_{i,x,t}) + \beta_5(MembershipIdeology_{i,x,t}) + \beta_6(Administrationyear_{i,x,t}) + \\
& \beta_7(Electionyear_{i,x,t}) + \beta_8(Foreign/DefensePolicy_{i,x,t}) + \beta_9(Force1-30days_{i,x,t}) + \\
& \beta_{10}(Force31-60days_{i,x,t}) + \beta_{11}(Force61-90days_{i,x,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,x,t}
\end{aligned} \tag{4}
$$

Where ($\mathrm{Y}_{i,x}$) represents the impact specific factors have on presidential support as well as the probability of presidential success from members of Congress, depending on which dependent variable is specified. The subscript (*i*) represents the individual vote being observed, (*x*) represents what unit of analysis is being examined, (*t-1*) signifies a one month lag from the observed key roll call vote, and ($\varepsilon_{i,x,t}$) represents a non-normally distributed error term.[47] Table 1.2 reviews the predicted relationships for all variables in the baseline specification models. All MLE models are reported using robust standard errors clustered by year to correct for any problems that may occur due to unspecified heteroskedasticity (StataCorp 2005). The results and analysis of these models will be discussed in the next chapter.

[47] Tests for multicollinearity among the independent variables specified for both of my House and Senate base line models have been conducted using correlation matrixes. In both data sets, multicollinearity was found not to be present.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

In the following chapter I report and analyze the results for the empirical models specified in the previous chapter. Overall, my tests of whether presidential decisions to initiate uses of force abroad lead to higher levels of legislative support and success in Congress yield mix findings. In fact, despite my main explanatory variables yielding highly significant and substantively large parameter estimates, my findings suggest that presidential decisions to initiate a use of force abroad leads to sharp decreases in legislative support, the exact opposite relationships hypothesized by my theory. Evidence of congressional rally effects are found among members of the president's party and when presidents are able to tie key roll call vote to matters of US foreign policy and national defense. But, in both cases, the positive impacts found may play only a limited role in alleviating presidents of the domestic woes plaguing their administrations. Initiated violent conflicts abroad are found to have little or no impact on overall presidential success and bi-partisan support in Congress. Whatever substantive impacts that they may have on congressional support only appear when controls for policy area are in place. Even then, uses of force are still, for the most part, an insignificant factor on legislative outcomes. Instead, for both legislative support and success, the primary force influencing membership decision-making is each member's partisan affiliations. Administrations serving during times with higher numbers of co-partisans in Congress should, on average, receive higher levels of legislative support and success than otherwise, re-affirming past findings from the congressional literature

(e.g. Fiorina 1977; Kingdom 1981; Aldrich 1995; see also Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989).

5.1 Summary Statistics and Apparent Trends in the Data

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present summary statistics for the dependent variables specified above to examine presidential support and success in Congress for both the House and Senate. Statistics are presented divided by chamber for a more in-depth look at how each institution responds to presidential preferences. From Table 2.1, presidents, on average, are expected to receive a thin majority of support for their legislative preferences in both chambers. Such findings are echoed in Table 2.2 where presidents are found to be successful at getting their policy preferences through both the House and Senate 59.18 and 65.77 percent of the time respectively. Differences in mean partisan support appear to follow what would be expected from the Congress literature (see, e.g. Aldrich 1994; Bond and Fleisher 1990) with much higher levels of support, on average, coming from co-partisan members versus those affiliated with the opposition party.

Presidents are also, on average, expected to receive higher levels of presidential support and success from members of the Senate across all four dependent variables. One interesting finding is that the mean value for co-partisan legislative support in the House is actually smaller than the mean legislative support presidents receive from the chamber as a whole; representing 51.31 and 51.38 percent membership support respectively. At first glance, it would appear that partisan forces may be stronger for members in the Senate than in the House. However, these apparent differences in presidential support and probabilities of presidential success may be due to institutional

variations found across both chambers. Frequent elections cause members of the House to be more reactionary to changes in public opinion and short-term political issues, while longer terms of office afford members of the Senate with more electoral insulation to act freely (see also Meernik 1993; Meernik and Oldmixon 2004). While these institutional differences may shape how members respond to uses of force, the extent to which such factor influence membership decision-making will be more fully addressed in the latter two stages of analysis.

Since all four dependent variables are generated based on the amount of presidential support extended by members of Congress, it is important to know whether the observed levels of support for both samples are skewed one way or another. Table 3 reports how presidential support is distributed in the House and Senate across the total range of variation in 20 percent increments. Looking at the chamber as a whole for both the House and Senate, we see that, by far, the largest proportion of votes occur in the middle -41-60%- support bracket, while smaller proportions of votes fall in the outer brackets. The distribution of presidential support for both dependent variables measuring partisan decision-making conform to expectations with the highest percentage of votes falling in the upper two distribution brackets for members of the president's party and the exact opposite for members belonging to the opposition party. These finding provide me with confidence that, despite both samples being made-up of only key roll call votes, membership decision-making follow predictable patterns of presidential support.

5.2 Results and Analysis for Presidential Support

In this section I report the results and analysis of multivariate statistical tests specified to examine how the initiation of violent conflicts abroad affect members' decision-making in regards to supporting the president's policy positions in Congress. To account for presidential support, I use multiple MLE models specified to analyze gamma distributed dependent variables. These models examine all key roll call votes for both the House and Senate for the years 1948 to 1993. Because the hypotheses derived from my theory are directional, predicting rallies of support from members directly after uses of force abroad, one-tail tests for statistical significance are reported in all tables. Results for all six models ran with my baseline specification examining presidential support are reported in the Table 4.1.

Across all six models, the primary variables of interest have been placed at the very bottom of each column. Through the three different use of force dummy variables I am able to test whether the presidential decision to initiate a violent conflict abroad positively impacts the amount of presidential support they receive for their policy preferences in Congress. Looking at both models examining the chamber as a whole (Models 1 and 4), the results indicate that initiating uses of force abroad do *not* lead to rallies of support for the president in Congress. In fact, the relationship that is reported expresses the exact opposite of what is predicted. Presidents, on average, should expect that members will extend *less* support for their policy preferences by 10.7 percent 31-60 days post-use of force in the House and 6.5 percent 1-30 days post-use of force in the Senate. Such evidence easily allows me to not reject the nulls for Hypothesis 1a and, subsequently, Hypothesis 2a. It also lends further credence to Howell and Pevehouse's (2005) argument that presidents should not exercise their

powers to initiate a use force abroad lightly, or else suffer the consequences of their decisions wrought by a hostile Congress. With these findings, it is not too hard to imagine a president flexing the US's military muscles abroad only to have his domestic influence severely weakened by disgruntled members at home. Substantively and statistically significant drops in presidential support of over 10 and 6 percent in the House and Senate could easily mean the difference in the successful or unsuccessful passage of important legislation. It also signifies that, for presidents that are already facing domestic problems, the decision to use of force abroad may make their positions even more vulnerable in the long-run.

Partisan affiliation appears to play a significant role in shaping how members respond to the initiation of violent conflicts abroad. From the remaining four models presented in Table 4.1 (Models 2, 3, 5, and 6), a clear split can be seen in how members support presidential preferences in the wake of initiated uses of force. Members belonging to the president's party display little to no response across chambers. The results show that members of the House that belong to the president's party are quick to rally to the president's side by extending greater amounts of support by 8 percent towards his policy preferences in the first 30 days after the initiation of a use of force. This substantive increase in support comes out to be statistically significant at below the .05 level. Co-partisan members within the Senate also show signs of rallies of presidential support post initiation of force. However, none of the coefficients on the use of force variables come close to meeting even the most lax thresholds for statistical significance. Together, these findings allow me to reject the

null for Hypothesis 3a for members of the House, while, simultaneously, failing to reject the null for Hypothesis 3a for members of the Senate.

On the other side of the isle, members belonging to the opposition party appear to not shy away from showing their dissatisfaction when presidents decide to initiate a violent conflict abroad. From Models 3 and 6, the results show that opposition members extend much *less* support to presidential preferences -by a sizeable 17 percent in the House and 11 percent in the Senate- 1-30 days and 31-60 days after the initiation of uses of force abroad, respectively. In both cases, the coefficients for these results beat the highest thresholds of statistical significance ($p<.01$). The overall impact of these findings causes me to easily *fail* to reject the nulls for Hypotheses 3b and 4b. It also provides us with a clearer understanding of why negative post-force relationships are found above for both chambers as a whole models (Models 1 and 4). It is apparent that the overwhelming drops in support presidents' face from members of the opposition are more than enough to overshadow any –miniscule in comparison- positive rallies of support that may occur from members of their own party.

Beyond simply looking at how members respond to uses of force abroad, important differences in membership decision-making appear to surface across chambers concerning when members respond. For the House and Senate, two out of three models examining each chamber (Models 1 & 3 and 4 & 6) show statistically significant drops in support after initiated uses of force abroad. In both cases, negative significant findings in the chamber as a whole (Models 1 and 4) can be seen as a reflection of the massive drops in presidential support by members of the opposition party (Models 3 and 6) during the same time periods. The similar relationships

expressed by both chambers can be attributed to partisan forces acting on members' decision-making. However, differences in membership timing can be attributed to institutional differences affecting members' responses differently. As expressed above, members of the House are thought to be more reactionary to changes in public opinion and interests due to more prevalent electoral forces. The 30 day hesitation displayed by the House opposition party can be seen as members testing the water of their constituent opinions before coming out with their own response. Failing to account for their constituents' reactions could lead to political problems that House members cannot afford. On the other hand, members of the Senate, with their longer terms of office and greater freedom to independently act, are quick to distance themselves from the president's policy preferences. Ironically, members of the House opposition party compensated for their slow response by generating much larger drops in presidential support than their co-partisan members in the Senate. The only statistically significant increases in presidential support observed across all six models comes from members of the president's party in the House within the first 30 days after the initiation of a use of force abroad. This, by far, is the only relationship found that could be considered a congressional rally; explaining why members of the president's party immediately respond with greater support for presidential preferences. All together, the partisan and institutional influences discussed above cause me to *not* reject the nulls for Hypotheses H2b and H4b, while, simultaneously, allowing me to *successfully* reject the null for H4a. After initial rallies, presidential support from members of the president's party quickly dissipates back to normal levels.

Beyond international affairs, the partisan make-up of each chamber is found to be the most substantive and statistically significant factor influencing members' decisions to support the president's policy preferences across all six models. The relationships expressed, with one clear exception (Model 6), follow closely with what had been expected; reaffirming previous findings concerning partisan affiliation in the Congress literature (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989: see also Fiorina 1977; Kingdom 1981; Aldrich 1995). Presidents, on average, should expect to receive increases in presidential support by 10.5 percent in the House and almost 40 percent in the Senate with every 1 percent increase in the president's party in chamber. Both of these results are statistically significant; surpassing, at least, the .05 threshold for directional one-tailed tests. Presidents should receive their largest increases in support –around 52 percent in both Model 2 and 4- from members of their own party with increases in their membership in both chambers. As predicted, increases of the President's party in House by 1 percent tend to cause members of the opposition party to decrease their support for the president by over 25 percent. Members of the opposition party in the Senate stand as the lone exception to the divisive partisan trend divisiveness found in other five models. The empirical evidence shows that these members extend significantly higher levels of presidential support –over 27 percent- as more members of the president's party gain seats in the chamber. Once again, these differences in behavior may be due to greater institutional freedoms felt by Senators; allowing them more opportunities to vote across party lines and ignore partisan rivalries.

The state of the economy plays a significant influence on whether members will support the president's policy preferences. Results show that unit increases in the rates

of unemployment and inflation are found to decrease presidential support in the House's chamber as a whole (Model 1) at under the .05 level of significance. These findings are matched with mixed and insignificant parameter estimates for the chamber as a whole in the Senate (Model 4). Poor economic performance had been predicted to lower presidential support among members of the opposition party, just as unit increases of unemployment lead to 2.9 percent decreases in support in the Senate. But, surprisingly, members of the opposition are found to increase their support in both the House by .86 percent and Senate by .87 percent with unit increases in inflation. These counter intuitive findings may be due to the non-uniform impact of high inflation on the population (see. Nincic 1997), or due to its root causes –unconstrained growth of the economy- actually benefiting constituents and, there by, benefiting members' interests.[48] Members of the president's party are found to have higher levels of presidential support during times of high unemployment (3.5 percent in the Senate) and for high inflation (1.2 percent in the Senate). Both of these findings reach statistical significance with each meeting, at least, the .05 threshold for one-tailed directional tests. In many ways, co-partisan members' behavior is not all that surprising considering that their electoral/political fortunes are often tied directly to how the public perceives the president's job performance (Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Campbell 1993; Jacobson 1997). During times of economic trouble, members of the president's party may try to bolster sitting president's domestic positions before deciding to withdraw their support.

[48] Hibbs (1977; 1987) finds that Democratic presidents are more likely to pursue Macroeconomic policies aimed at maintaining low levels of unemployment that, inadvertently, lead to higher levels of inflation. Such policies would be endorsed by fellow Democrats in Congress whose constituents benefit more from stable employment versus low inflation.

The remaining variables in my baseline specification tend to perform as predicted, with only a few minor exceptions. Unit increases in presidential popularity are found to lead to no substantive impact on presidential support across all six models. Interestingly, parameter estimates for all three models examining the House (Models 1-3) present evidence of a negative relationship between popularity and support, but coefficients for presidential popularity across all models fail to be statistically significant. The ideological make-up of the chamber comes out to be a significant influence on membership voting behavior in three out of the four models (Models 2, 3, and 5) specified to examine the effects of partisanship. In all three cases, the variables performed as expected with increases in liberalism leading to drops of 1.9, .97, and .74 percent in presidential support, respectively. Tenure in the White House, or administration year, is found to lead to substantive and statistically significant decreases in presidential support in the House's chamber as a whole and among members of the opposition party in the Senate. These decreases are enough that two term lame-duck presidents can expect, on average, almost 10 percent less support in the House and almost 24 percent less support among Senate opposition members going into their last year of office. Whether or not it is an election year for members of Congress yields mixed relationships across both chambers, and fails to reach any level of statistical significance. Finally, whether or not a key roll call vote concerns US foreign policy or defense is found to only significantly matter to members of the president's party in the Senate (Model 5). The presence of such a vote, rather surprisingly, leads to a substantive 7 percent drop in presidential support.

In Table 4.2, I present results for an expanded version of the baseline model specification discussed above in order to test whether initiated violent conflicts have varying impacts on members' voting behavior across different policy areas. I test for variations in presidential support by adding several interaction terms. Three interaction terms have been derived by multiplying my foreign/defense policy dummy variable with each of my three use of force dummy variables. The product of each interaction represents a dummy variable that signifies whether or not a specific key roll call vote taking place within 1-30, 31-60, and 61-90 days of an initiated use of force concerns matters of US foreign policy or national defense. Otherwise, the key roll call vote concern matters of domestic or political policy. Together, along with the original Use of Force variables, these new interactions terms are specified to test Hypotheses 4a, 5a, and 5b. The creation of my interaction terms using the foreign/defense policy dummy variable also creates tacit interactions between my uses of force variables that have yet to be accounted for. Failure to include variables to control for these tacit interactions automatically assumes the impact of such relationships as 0 (Braumoeller 2004). Tests for the presence of tacit interactions have found that no additional variables are needed within the models examining the House (Models 7-9), while two additional variables accounting for interactions between votes that occur 1-30 and 31-60 days after as well as 31-60 and 61-90 days after uses of force are required within models examining the Senate (Models 10-12).

Focusing on the key variables of interest, all of the reported relationships addressed above –except one- remain statistically significant and pointing in the same direction even with the inclusion of multiple interaction terms. Interestingly, the only

significant relationship that fails to resurface from Table 4.1, positive increases in support from members of the president's party within 30 days of initiating a use of force, represents the only evidence suggesting that congressional rallies of support do occur. Another departure from previous findings is that members of the opposition party are now seen to be the only partisan group significantly responding to presidents' decisions to initiate a use force abroad. Their reactions, just as in the previous six models, appear to significantly decrease the amount of support that presidents should expect from both chambers as a whole (Model 7 and 10). Lack of significant findings for members of the president's party (Models 8 and 11) may be due to the already high levels of support normally shown, making it much more difficult for surges of presidential support to be detected. Lastly, members of the Senate's opposition party are predicted to *increase* their support by 10.25 percent for the president's policy preferences concerning domestic and political policies 31-60 days after the initiation of a use of force, holding all else constant. However, problems estimating some parameter estimates along with their standard errors within Model 12 cause any significant findings presented to be viewed as suspect. Therefore, in the remaining analysis, results from Model 12 will only be discussed in general terms in order to minimize errors due to false inferences.

The inclusion of the interaction terms within the baseline specification provide us with some important information regarding membership decision-making and presidential support. Significant negative relationships associated with initiating a violent conflict abroad provide evidence that members of the opposition party (Models 9 and 12) –and subsequently the chamber as a whole (Models 7 and 10)- extend much less support to presidential preferences for votes specifically concerning matters of

domestic and political policy. It is also important to note that the substantive impacts of all of the negative coefficients increase in size when only domestic and political policy interests are being considered. From these findings, we can surmise that the smaller negative findings of previous use of force variables could be due –in part- to the inclusion of foreign/defense votes that dilute their overall impacts. Evidence from the interaction term used to account for tacit interactions between the use of force 31-60 and 61-90 variables finds that repeated periods of conflict (where presidents initiate interstate disputes where force is used two months in a row) bring decreases in presidential support among members of the opposition party and, subsequently, the chamber as a whole by as much as 23 percent and 16 percent, respectively. Overall, for domestically troubled presidents, the negative congressional relationships associated with acts of aggression abroad only make it harder for them to promote and implement domestic policies that can address the country's problems. Thus, presidents will only find their ability to act in the domestic arena even more constrained after initiating a diversionary military action abroad.

Members' decision-making in regards to key roll call votes concerning matters of foreign policy and national defense post-initiation of a use of force tells a decidedly different story. For the most part, the (use of force x foreign/domestic) interaction terms perform exactly as predicted above. Once again, violent interstate conflicts appear to have their most significant effects on the voting behavior of members of the opposition party in both chambers. Presidents, on average, should expect to receive increases of support from opposition members in both the House (18.66 percent) and Senate (11.11 percent) on foreign/national defense key roll call votes 1-30 days after initiating a use of

force abroad. In the Senate, these opposition rallies are enough to translate into increases in presidential support from the chamber as a whole by 12.76 percent during the same period. Coefficients for all three relationships are found to be statistically significant at the .05 level for one-tailed directional tests. The findings also show that opposition members in the House (Model 9) dramatically increase their support by 36.99 percent for the president's policy preferences on key foreign/defense roll call votes 31-60 days after uses of force. This highly substantive relationship is also statistically significant at the highest level (.01) for one-tailed tests. Finally, consistent positive and statistically significant increases in presidential support are reported for the House's chamber as a whole (12.72 percent), House members of the opposition party (22.46 percent), the Senate's Chamber as a Whole (14.15 percent), the President's party in the Senate (22.51 percent), and the Senate's opposition party (37.26 percent) on key foreign/defense roll call votes 61-90 days after the initiation of a use of force abroad. The contrasting relationships between foreign/defense votes versus those concerning domestic/political policies clearly lends further evidence to Wildavasky's (1966; see also Bond and Fleisher 1988) two presidencies thesis of asymmetrical presidential influence in the legislative process. However, the full extent of this additional power has yet to be determined.

To fully understand how important variations in policy area play in members' decision-making we must examine the marginal effects from both the upper and lower order interaction terms. Table 4.3 presents the predicted results for all interaction terms in Models 7-12. For each thirty day conflict initiation period being observed, three rows are assigned to list the predicted impacts of key roll call votes involving

domestic/political policies (the coefficient on the use of force variables), the *additional* predicted impacts of key roll call votes that involve foreign/defense policy matters (the coefficient of corresponding interaction variables), and the overall net impacts of key foreign/defense roll call votes on presidential support. The label "No Effect" displayed for all use of force and interaction variables that fail to meet even the most lax level of statistical significance.

The results offer evidence that members, especially of the opposition party, provide rallies of presidential support on key foreign/defense roll call votes in the wake of an initiated violent conflict abroad. In every instance, save one, where statistically significant relationships are reported for the interaction terms, the recorded total net impacts on member decision-making (reported in bold) produce double-digit increases in presidential support. It is clear that the substantively large coefficients reported for the interaction terms above more than compensate for the very large decreases in presidential support associated with votes concerning domestic/political issues. The lone exception to these findings comes from Model 12 where initiated uses of force suspiciously produce a 1.6 percent *decrease* in presidential support among Senate opposition members. But, even if this net impact is true, the coefficient on the corresponding interaction is still large enough to make it a minor loss for the president. All together, these findings provide me with more than enough evidence to reject the nulls for Hypotheses 4a, 5a, and 5b. Members of Congress provide greater support to presidential preferences on key roll call votes concerning foreign/defense policies than key roll call votes on domestic/political polices after initiated uses of force abroad.

5.3 Results and Analysis of Presidential Success

In the previous section, tests are presented to examine how the initiation of violent conflicts abroad impact members' decisions to support presidential policy preferences. While membership support is critical for presidents to realize their legislative agendas, higher presidential support does not always directly translate into greater presidential success in getting policy preferences passed through Congress. To account for this disparity, I ran multiple MLE probit models to examine how uses of force abroad impact the probability that presidents are able to obtain simple majorities of support for their policy preferences in Congress. Just as in the previous models, all key roll call votes in the House and Senate are examined, and directional one-tail tests for statistical significance are reported. Results for the baseline probit models examining the likelihood that presidents successfully obtain simple majorities for both chambers are reported in Tables 5.1. In Tables 5.2, the baseline probit models are expanded in order to test how initiated uses of force abroad affect presidential success in Congress across different policy areas.

I begin this stage of analysis by reviewing the overall fit of the probit models being presented. Looking first at each model's Wald X^2 summary statistic, we can see that the greater majority of the models easily reject the null that all of the independent variables are, jointly, no different from zero. Overall, the four models presented perform reasonably well at predicting presidential success. The baseline specification for the House (Model 13) correctly predicts 62.57 percent of key roll call vote outcomes with a 7.59 percent proportionate reduction of error (PROE) over the modal category.[49] In the Senate, the baseline specification correctly predicts 68.48 percent with a PROE of 7.13

[49] Proportionate reduction of error is calculated as "(percent correctly predicted – modal percentage of dependent variable) / 100 – modal percentage of dependent variable" (Meernik and Oldmixon 2004 pp 458).

percent. Predictive accuracy is found to decrease with the inclusion of interaction terms testing for differences across policy areas. Presidential success in the House is correctly predicted 61.73 percent of the time with a PROE of 4.92 percent. Success in the Senate is correctly predicted 68.52 percent of the time leading to a 6.43 PROE.

Turning to the key variables, presidential decisions to initiate a violent conflict abroad are found not to significantly alter their chances of getting their legislative preferences through Congress. For both the House and Senate, all three use of force variables –with one exception- are found to be insignificant predictors of presidential success. In the one case where the initiation of a violent conflict does significantly matter (Model 14), presidents should expect an almost 24 percent decline in presidential success in the Senate 61-90 days after initiation. From these findings, I am unable to reject the nulls for Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b. Presidents are not more likely to be successful in Congress shortly after the initiation of uses of force abroad.

With the findings presented on presidential support in the previous section, the lack of significant relationships provides crucial insight into membership decision-making. Despite consistently negative significant relationships found for the chamber as a whole in both the House and Senate, we see that membership responses to US initiated uses of force, both negative and positive, rarely impact the final determination of key roll call votes. Therefore, presidents who initiate violent conflicts abroad should, on average, expect to be as successful as they normally would on key roll call votes, excluding the sole exception discussed above. To account for this disparity in my findings, I present two plausible explanations. First, members, especially those belonging to the opposition party, may act strategically in their decisions on how they

respond to presidents acting aggressively abroad. In that, those members deciding to show support or dissatisfaction with the president after initiating uses of force choose to do so, while, at the same time, making sure that their responses do not directly impact the key legislation's final outcome. Thus, members strategically insure that the policy preferences of their constituents continue to be represented, allowing them to better maintain their positions in office. A competing explanation is that lack of findings may be due to aggregating all bill types together. Differences found across policy areas in the previous section may, in effect, be canceling each other out. Tests further examining this explanation will be conducted later in the analysis.

In general, the remaining control variables specified in all four models perform as would be expected, with only minor deviations. One unit increases in the president's party in chamber increases the probability that presidents are able to obtain simple majorities in the House and Senate by 74 percent and 136 percent, respectively. Both of these relationships are statistically significant at, at least, the .05 level for directional one-tailed tests. Economic factors are found to play a significant role in membership decision-making. Unit increases of unemployment in the House lead to 2 percent decline in the probability that presidents receive a simple majority. Other than that, increases in Inflation, surprisingly, leads to a 1.3 percent increase in the House. presidential popularity, for the first time, is found to be a significant predictor of membership behavior leading to unit increase of .7 percent in the probability of receiving a simple majority in the Senate. More tenure is in office is found to lead to very small .1 percent decreases in the probability that presidents' are able to successfully obtain a

majority of support in Congress. All remaining control variables specified in the four models perform as predicted, but fail to reach any level of statistical significance.

Tables 5.2 present an expanded version of my baseline specification in order to examine how the initiation of uses of force abroad impact presidential success across different policy areas. From the start, we can see that accounting for foreign/defense policies versus domestic/political policies allows for more statistically significant relationships for my Uses of Force variables to be observed, confirming my second conclusion. Presidential success in the House is found to decrease by 27 percent on domestic/political votes within 30 days of a use of force, while a similar decrease of 31 percent taking place in the Senate 61-90 days of a use of force. These relationships come out to be statistically significant using one-tailed directional tests. Predicted relationships for the remaining Use of Force variables display a mix of positive and negative coefficients for presidential success. But, these relationships fail to meet statistical significance.

Interaction terms in several of the models are found to be statistically significant as well. Foreign/domestic votes taking place in the House 1-30 days and in the Senate 61-90 days after the initiation of uses of force abroad are found to exhibit increases in presidential success. Not surprisingly, just as in the previous section, the majority of these significant relationships correspond with significant negative findings for the use of force variables. The coefficients for the other interaction terms fail to meet statistical significance at even the lowest levels for one-tailed tests. Coefficients for the significant relationships appear to be large and pointing in the expected direction. However, at this

point, the true substantive impacts of these relationships remain unclear until we assess each of their marginal effects.

Table 5.3 presents the marginal effects for the four models examining presidential success and bi-partisan support. As can be seen from the net impacts displayed in bold, each of the three significant interaction terms produces a positive net impact on the likelihood on presidential success or bi-partisan support. Key foreign/defense roll call votes are associated with almost a 4 percent increase in the probability of presidential success within 30 days of an initiation of violent conflict. Similarly, a 30.5 percent increase is associated with key foreign/defense roll call votes within the Senate 61-90 days after a use of force. Both of these impacts, especially from the Senate, are substantively large changes in presidential success compared to chamber reactions to key roll call votes concerning matters of domestic/political issues. All together, more than enough evidence remains to support Hypothesis 5b. Presidents, on average, should expect to be more successful in getting their policy preferences through both chambers of Congress shortly after the initiation of a use of force abroad.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, multiple statistical techniques have been employed to test two distinct research questions; a) do members of Congress rally in support of presidential policy preferences shortly after the initiation of violent conflicts abroad and b) do presidents use their constitutionally assigned powers as Commander in Chief to obtain greater political success at home. These questions are examined using all key roll call votes in both the House and Senate for the years 1948 to 1993. I find that a majority of evidence presented in this study indicates that members of Congress, especially those of the opposition party, significantly change their voting behavior in response to presidents initiating violent conflicts abroad, but not in any way that is consistent with the most basic and underlying assumptions associated with the theory presented here or what we should expect from the diversionary narrative. Such findings present clear negative implications for theorists that continue to present diversionary behavior as an explanation for presidential foreign policy decision-making.

In the wake of initiating a violent conflict abroad, the evidence suggests that presidents, on average, should expect to receive sharp decreases in support of up to 11 percent in the House and up to 6 percent in the Senate from the chamber as a whole. These findings are completely contradictory to the predicted relationships offered by my theory of congressional rally effects, outlined earlier in Chapter 3. The evidence also suggests that strategically minded presidents, feeling constrained in their abilities to take action at the domestic level, would be unwise to act aggressively abroad, or else face even greater political difficulties in the aftermath. It is at such times, after initial

rallies –if any- of approval have subsided, that presidents may find that the economic or political problems they attempted to forestall still remain, their constituents are even more miserable, and their abilities to act are even more hampered than before the diversionary action (Meernik and Waterman 1996). Together, by considering post-force impacts on congressional behavior, my findings provide new evidence to a growing body of literature arguing that presidents cannot simply initiate violent conflicts abroad to obtain their own selfish benefits at home.

The results presented above also critically address one of the most explicit assumptions made within the diversionary literature regarding what incentives are driving presidential decision-making. Although evidence of presidents receiving some form of boosts in public support after uses of force has been widely documented, exactly when such rally events occur and their overall impact on presidential approval is still widely debated. This thesis adds to this debate by presenting new evidence that predictable rally effect do not occur within Congress. In fact, presidential decisions to initiate violent conflicts abroad are found to cause sharp decreases of presidential support and success across both chambers of Congress, driven, primarily, by substantively large decreases in support among members of the opposition party. Across all twelve presidential support models, members of the opposition party routinely present the most powerful responses to presidential decisions to act aggressively abroad. And, with only very specific exceptions, these negative responses are resolutely against the actions of the president. Such reactions clearly fly in the face of the assumed unifying character of diversionary behavior. Presidential decisions to initiate a violent conflict abroad are found to be a polarizing stimulus among members of

Congress. Also, it is telling that the most visceral reactions repeatedly occur among members of the Opposition party. Their strongly negative reactions make it evident that initiating a violent conflict abroad only exacerbates partisan division already present within Congress rather than rallying membership support. Just as in the previous literature, the general results do not lend support or an explanation for any incentive for presidents to use diversionary behavior.

Beyond simple rally effects, my findings also shed further insights concerning one of the more popular variants of diversionary theory originally put forth by Morgan and Bicker (1993). The results show very weak support for their theory that presidents are most likely to use force abroad in order to reverse dropping approval levels among members of their own party. In general, the only evidence supporting the presence of a diversionary incentive from Congress comes from co-partisan members from the House. When looking at general voting behavior, members of the president's party in the House are seen to increase their support for the president's policy preferences by as much as 8 percent in the first 30 days after initiating a use of force abroad. The significance of this relationship disappears as more time passes, following the short-term rallies of approval predicted by theory. Despite these initial affirmative results, the same variables examining the impact of initiating a use of force produce insignificant parameter estimates in all of the other president's party models. This lack of findings is most interesting considering Edwards and Swenson's (1997) past findings that individuals already predisposed to supporting the president are the most likely to rally in support after uses of force abroad. One possibility is that the lack of significant findings from the other co-partisan models may be due to the already high amount of support

expressed by members of the president's party. However, the relatively mediocre mean levels of support in the low fifties in the House and low sixties in the Senate do offer a considerable amount of room for support to vary upwards. Overall, the findings suggest that the centralized rallies of support observed among members of the president's party in the House are clearly overshadowed by the aggregate losses in support from the chambers as a whole. Presidents may be able to partially curtail dropping levels of support among members of their own party, but, in effect, they would be trading one domestic problem for another.

In addition to addressing theoretical issues involving diversionary theory, my findings also speak to how congressional behavior can indirectly influence presidential decision-making on matters concerning US foreign policy and national security. Recent work by Clark (2000) and Howell and Pevehouse (2004) in the conflict literature have found evidence that the presence of divided government or a strong opposition within Congress indirectly reduces the likelihood that presidents decide to use force abroad. Much of this constraint on executive power has been attributed to the additional political and domestic costs that members of Congress can inflict on presidents after initiating a use of force. However, despite much theorizing and work on Congress's ability to influence the president, to my knowledge, this thesis is the first to present direct evidence of the negative impacts presidents should expect to receive from Congress and members of the opposition party after initiating a violent conflict abroad. The sharp decreases in presidential support and success after the initiation of violent conflicts abroad lends strong support for previous findings of congressional constraint on US conflict behavior. They also provide evidence of why future studies of presidential

decision-making in regards to the use of force should theoretically account for Congress's response to pursuing confrontational foreign policies.

Another issue that my results address is how members of Congress respond differently across issue areas after the initiation of violent conflicts abroad. Members of Congress are found to provide presidents with double digit increases in both presidential support and success on key roll call votes concerning matters of foreign policy and national defense in the wake of an initiated use of force. However, these increases are often in sharp contrast to the significant double digit decreases in presidential support and success that occur at the same time on key roll call votes concerning domestic and political issues. This evidence suggests that variations in members' voting behavior across issue areas could allow for strategically minded presidents to increase their political fortunes at home through displays of international aggression. But, the same variations in voting behavior also limits presidents' abilities to obtain benefits to only legislation linked to international affairs. Whether presidents, by maintaining such links, may be able to, in the long-term, re-establish their positions of leadership within the US (see, Richards et. al. 1993) is yet to be determined. What can be determined is that members of the chamber as a whole and the opposition party, at such times, will pose much greater constraints on presidents concerning their domestic agendas. Together, these variations in congressional voting behavior offer a more refined approach to explaining presidential decision-making in regards to the use of force as well as employing diversionary behavior. It also leaves us to wonder if rallies of greater congressional support within the international arena are enough to sustain

presidents whose constituents may be struggling due to their constrained capacities to act domestically.

Fortunately, the relationship between Congress and presidential decisions to initiate violent conflicts abroad offers a viable research agenda where such questions can be addressed. Future work may want to further examine how initiating uses of force abroad affect members of the House and Senate differently. While some explanations have been presented above, an abundant of other factors not covered in this work may better explicate observed differences in how members of the House and Senate respond. Other scholars may wish to shift the level of analysis from the aggregate support scores presented here to how initiating violent conflicts impact the voting behavior of individual members of Congress. Here partisan, tenure, regional, and constituent factors, to name just a few, could provide a greater understanding of member decision-making than studies than aggregate studies that theoretically assume a monolithic Congress. Matters of timing of important votes may be the subject of future scholarly work. Are votes on the president's agenda more likely to come up in either chamber of Congress after initiating uses of force abroad? Do presidents have to make fewer concessions to get legislation passed through Congress after initiating uses of force abroad? These questions, and many others, could go a long way toward illuminating how inter-branch relations influence and shape membership response as well as presidential decision-making involving international conflict.

Diversionary theorists have offered a theoretical path for presidents to regain their positions of prominence from out of the political doldrums. But, in their quest to understand and explain when presidents are most likely to use force abroad, they have

often failed to account for the salient post-force impacts such decisions will have on members of Congress. This theoretical omission is surprising sense congressional members are often the president's greatest critics and serve as the institutional origin for their domestic constraints. From the evidence presented here, future diversionary and congressional research will benefit from further work on how members of Congress are affected by presidential decisions to initiate uses of force abroad.

APPENDIX A

Table 1.1: Dependent Variable Descriptions

#	NAME	DISTRIBUTION	MIN	MAX
1)	Presidential Support Chamber as a Whole	Continuous	0	100
2)	Presidential Support President's Party	Continuous	0	100
3)	Presidential Support Opposition Party	Continuous	0	100
4)	Presidential Success Simple Majority	Dichotomous	0	1

Table 1.2: Predicted Relationships for Baseline Model Specification, House and Senate

Dependent Variable:	*Chamber as A Whole*	*President's Party*	*Opposition Party*	*Presidential Success*
Presidential Popularity	+	+	+	+
Unemployment	-	-	-	-
Inflation	-	-	-	-
President's Party in Chamber	+	+	-	+
Chamber Ideology	-	-	-	-
Administration Year	-	-	-	-
Election Year	-	-	-	-
Foreign/Defense Policy	+	+	+	+
Use of Force 1-30 days	+	+	+	+
Use of Force 31-60 days	+	+	+	+
Use of Force 61-90 days	+	+	+	+

Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables, House and Senate 1948-1993				
Chamber: House	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Chamber as a Whole	51.38	15.50	0.72	100
President's Party	51.31	29.39	0	100
Opposition Party	32.88	24.71	0	100
Chamber: Senate	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Chamber as a Whole	55.53	17.33	12.82	100
President's Party	59.01	28.36	0	100
Opposition Party	37.12	27.16	0	100

Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables, House and Senate 1948-1993					
Chamber: House	Followed	%	~Followed	%	Cum.
President's Position Followed	217	59.18	146	40.22	363
Chamber: Senate	Followed	%	~Followed	%	Cum.
President's Position Followed	219	65.77	114	34.33	333

Table 3: Distribution of Congressional Support for the House and Senate, 1948-1993					
Chamber: House	0-20%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	81-100%
Chamber as a Whole	12	58	**207**	73	13
%	(3.31)	(15.98)	**(57.02)**	(20.11)	(3.58)
President's Party	68	83	58	**68**	**86**
%	(18.73)	(22.87)	(15.98)	**(18.73)**	**(23.69)**
Opposition Party	**143**	**95**	68	35	22
%	**(39.39)**	**(26.17)**	(18.73)	(9.64)	(6.06)
Chamber: Senate					
Chamber as a Whole	6	49	**165**	78	35
%	(1.80)	(14.71)	**(49.55)**	(23.42)	(10.51)
President's Party	48	48	55	**94**	**91**
%	(13.51)	(14.41)	(16.52)	**(28.23)**	**(27.33)**
Opposition Party	**103**	**102**	61	32	35
%	**(30.93)**	**(30.63)**	(18.32)	(9.61)	(10.51)

Table 4.1: Presidential Support on House and Senate Key Roll Call Votes 1948-1993 GLM Estimates

	House			Senate		
Model #	1	2	3	4	5	6
Dependent Variable:	*c*	*p*	*o*	*c*	*p*	*o*
Constant	69.25***	100.38***	93.92***	42.67***	34.555	75.46***
	(10.85)	(27.09)	(26.02)	(16.74)	(20.88)	(28.19)
Presidential Popularity	-.034	-.031	-.034	.112	.136	-.114
	(.0773)	(.2272)	(.2050)	(.0996)	(.1939)	(.2585)
Unemployment	-.811**	1.235	-1.376	-.294	3.465†††	-2.901***
	(.4327)	(1.691)	(.9755)	(.8545)	(1.030)	(1.203)
Inflation	-.3310**	1.219††	.864††	.477	-.248	.867
	(.1552)	(.7246)	(.5113)	(.4189)	(.7787)	(.5622)
President's Party in Chamber	10.563**	52.05***	-25.634***	39.95***	52.386***	27.712††
	(5.533)	(17.90)	(10.81)	(12.39)	(16.07)	(16.59)
Chamber Ideology	-.215	-1.970***	-.973***	-.262	-.735**	-.628
	(.1548)	(.4971)	(.3734)	(.2366)	(.3709)	(.4233)
Administration Year	-1.306***	.077	-.756	-.830	.532	-3.419**
	(.5241)	(1.428)	(1.014)	(.8842)	(.9922)	(1.693)
Election Year	-1.889	-1.155	3.437	-1.273	.494	6.931
	(1.347)	(5.311)	(3.004)	(2.798)	(4.045)	(6.367)
Foreign/Defense Policy	2.229	-.302	4.460	2.077	-7.059††	.4.049
	(1.971)	(3.801)	(3.179)	(2.161)	(3.112)	(3.667)
Use of Force 1-30 days	-5.052	8.331**	3.426	-6.450††	4.937	-10.98†††
	(4.805)	(4.861)	(6.152)	(3.205)	(6.056)	(3.707)
Use of Force 31-60 days	-10.68†††	4.889	-17.19†††	2..255	-.745	8.766
	(3.792)	(4.406)	(2.706)	(3.147)	(4.500)	(8.144)
Use of Force 61-90 days	1.340	-6.832	6.850	-5.552	1.753	-4.402
	(2.304)	(5.457)	(6.023)	(4.308)	(5.224)	(12.829)
N	358	358	358	330	330	330
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-1766.615	-1761.237	-1597.863	-1654.558	-1672.776	-1516.602
BIC	-1987.348	-1869.966	-1785.480	-1809.978	-1716.512	-1656.888

Significance at $p \leq .01$ (one-tailed predicted relationships) denoted by ***, and at $p \leq .05$ by **.
Significance at $p \leq .01$ (one-tailed relationships opposite of those predicted) denoted by †††, and at $p \leq .05$ by ††. Robust Standard Errors, Clustered by Year reported in parentheses.

Dependent variable (*c*) represents presidential support from members of the chamber as a whole, (*p*) represents president's party, and (*o*) represents opposition party.

Table 4.2: Presidential Support on House and Senate Key Roll Call Votes 1948-1993 GLM Estimates

	House			Senate		
Model #:	7	8	9	10	11	12
Dependent Variable:	*c*	*p*	*o*	*C*	*p*	*o*
Constant	67.76***	104.39***	85.43***	45.09***	36.41**	88.86
	(11.558)	(32.561)	(21.940)	(17.540)	(21.966)	--
Presidential Popularity	-.034	-.099	-.009	.125	.146	.026
	(.0772)	(.3574)	(.1495)	(.1023)	(.2114)	--
Unemployment	-.621	1.401	-.690	-.328	3.60†††	-3.151
	(.4965)	(1.6362)	(.9480)	(.8450)	(.9892)	--
Inflation	-.335**	1.01	.713†††	.468	-.300	1.114
	(.1597)	(.8883)	(.2865)	(.4174)	(.7563)	--
President's Party in Chamber	11.49**	54.30***	-20.89***	37.28***	50.94**	9.963
	(5.5672)	(17.992)	(8.9916)	(13.282)	(15.743)	--
Chamber Ideology	-.206	-2.003***	-.901***	-.285	-3769**	-.868
	(.1597)	(.4864)	(.3519)	(.2408)	(.3587)	--
Administration Year	-1.225***	.054	-.832	-.818	.485	-3.708
	(.5397)	(1.3793)	(.9893)	(.8756)	(.9685)	--
Election Year	-2.020	-.982	3.352	-.816	1.396	9.141†††
	(1.354)	(5.3937)	(2.4182)	(2.7005)	(4.0067)	(2.9330)
Foreign/Defense Policy	.207	.021	-2.113	-.885	-9.957†††	-1.665
	(1.8243)	(4.2677)	(2.9949)	(2.4212)	(3.4608)	(2.4037)
Use of Force 1-30 days	-7.626	7.341	-2.870	-11.55†††	1.982	-12.71†††
	(6.0087)	(8.2182)	(6.5189)	(4.6481)	(6.9625)	(.2801)
Use of Force 1-30 days x Foreign/Defense Policy	7.174	1.386	18.664**	12.76***	3.729	11.11***
	(5.9492)	(15.630)	(9.4085)	(5.4040)	(13.790)	(3.5203)
Use of Force 31-60 days	-13.17†††	2.224	-21.49†††	3.167	-2.139	10.25**
	(2.7966)	(5.5728)	(2.9237)	(4.1411)	(8.0925)	(5.8836)
Use of Force 31-60 days x Foreign/Defense Policy	10.764	14.334	36.99***	6.721	9.523	14.523
	(12.304)	(15.155)	(14.407)	(12.370)	(22.468)	(21.675)
Use of Force 61-90 days	-1.543	-3.483	1.386	-8.040	-4.989	-15.08
	(1.8467)	(11.506)	(5.9685)	(6.1395)	(6.7374)	--
Use of Force 61-90 days x Foreign/Defense Policy	12.718**	-13.096	22.46**	14.15**	22.51**	37.26***
	(7.1974)	(34.006)	(12.507)	(7.8498)	(10.929)	(12.741)
Use of Force 30*60 days	__	__	__	-.040	12.626	4.231

				(11.790)	(24.090)	(18.4731)
Use of Force 60*90 days	__	__	__	-15.95†††	-12.309	-21.30†††
				(5.9333)	(10.366)	(6.2333)
N	358	358	358	330	330	330
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-1766.410	-1760.982	-1760.983	-1654.029	-1672.109	-1492.631
BIC	-1970.152	-1853.103	-1853.103	-1782.041	-1688.673	-1633.260

Significance at $p \leq .01$ (one-tailed predicted relationships) denoted by ***, and at $p \leq .05$ by **.
Significance at $p \leq .01$ (one-tailed relationships opposite of those predicted) denoted by †††, and at $p \leq .05$ by ††. Robust Standard Errors, Clustered by Year reported in parentheses. The (–) in the place of Robust Standard Errors represent parameter estimates presented without standard errors, *z*-scores, and corresponding *z*-values.

Dependent variable (*c*) represents presidential support from members of the chamber as a whole, (*p*) represents president's party, and (*o*) represents opposition party.

Table 4.3: Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms from Models 7-12

		House			Senate		
		c	p	o	c	p	o
1-30 Days	Domestic/Political	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect	-11.55	No Effect	-12.71
	Foreign/Defense	No Effect	No Effect	18.664	12.76	No Effect	11.11
	Net Impact	No Effect	No Effect	**18.664**	**1.21**	No Effect	**-1.6**
31-60 Days	Domestic/Political	-13.17	No Effect	-21.49	No Effect	No Effect	10.25
	Foreign/Defense	No Effect	No Effect	36.99	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect
	Net Impact	No Effect	No Effect	**15.5**	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect
61-90 Days	Domestic/Political	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect
	Foreign/Defense	12.718	No Effect	22.46	14.15	22.51	37.26
	Net Impact	**12.72**	No Effect	**22.46**	**14.15**	**22.51**	**37.26**
Use of Force 30*60		--	--	--	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect
Use of Force 60*90		--	--	**--**	**-15.95**	No Effect	**-21.30**

Dependent variable (*c*) represents presidential support from members of the chamber as a whole, (*p*) represents president's party, and (*o*) represents opposition party.

Table 5.1: Presidential Success in the House and Senate 1948-1993 Probit Estimates

Model#:	House 13			Senate 14		
Variable	Coefficient.	Standard Error	Marginal Effect	Coefficient.	Standard Error	Marginal Effect
Constant	1.048	1.033	--	-2.370	.9766***	--
Presidential Popularity	0.001	0.0073	.0002	.020	.0053***	.0073
Unemployment	-0.008	0.0566	-.0078	.040	.0582	.0144
Inflation	-0.008	0.0233	-.0033	.070	.0355††	.0252
President's Party in Chamber	1.919	.7427***	.7407	3.764	.8033***	1.3586
Chamber Ideology	-0.027	0.0168	-.0110	-.017	.0150	-.0061
Administration Year	-0.096	.0445**	-.0369	-.008	.0557	-.0028
Election Year	-0.172	0.1646	-.0660	-.103	.1708	--.0371
Foreign/Defense Policy	0.129	0.1854	.0493	.087	.1562	.0313
Use of Force 1-30 Days	-0.286	0.2002	-.1126	.034	.2751	.0121
Use of Force 31-60 Days	-0.543	0.4069	-.2139	.289	.2547	.0976
Use of Force 61-90 Days	0.223	0.319	.0832	-.642	.2467†††	-.2474
N	358			330		
Wald X^2	33.99***			51.84***		
Percent Correctly Predicted	62.57%			68.48%		
Proportionate Reduction of Error	7.59%			7.13%		

Significance at $p \leq .01$ (one-tailed predicted relationships) denoted by ***, and at $p \leq .05$ by **. Significance at $p \leq .01$ (one-tailed relationships opposite of those predicted) denoted by †††, and at $p \leq .05$ by ††. Robust Standard Errors, Clustered by Year reported in parentheses. The (–) in the place of Robust Standard Errors represent parameter estimates presented without standard errors, *z*-scores, and corresponding *z*-values.

Table 5.2: Presidential Success in the House and Senate 1948-1993 Probit Estimates

	House			Senate		
Model #:		15			16	
Dependent Variable:	Coefficient.	Standard Error	Marginal Effect	Coefficient.	Standard Error	Marginal Effect
Constant	.840	1.020	--	-2.465	.9796***	--
Presidential Popularity	.001	.072	.0006	.021	.0064***	.0077
Unemployment	-.013	.0562	-.0049	.040	.0531	.0144
Inflation	-.007	.0229	-.0028	.068	.0350††	.0246
President's Party in Chamber	2.024	.7131***	.7808	3.821	.7954***	1.3725
Chamber Ideology	-.026	.0167	-.0100	-.017	.0155	-.0061
Administration Year	-.085	.0426**	-.0326	.003	.0518	.0011
Election Year	-.195	.1659	-.0751	-.075	.1584	-.0271
Foreign/Defense Policy	-.009	.2001	-.0033	-.067	.1942	-..0241
Use of Force 1-30 days	-.692	.2600†††	-.2705	-.225	.3567	-.0840
Use of Force 1-30 days x Foreign/Defense Policy	1.137	.3091***	.3246	.716	.6009	.2061
Use of Force 31-60 days	-.582	.4338	-.2288	.363	.2984	.1190
Use of Force 31-60 days x Foreign/Defense Policy	.126	.6740	.0477	--	--	--
Use of Force 61-90 days	.092	.3009	.0349	-.805	.3662††	-.3101
Use of Force 61-90 days x Foreign/Defense Policy	.540	.6214	.1853	1.100	.6149**	.2703
N	358			330		
Wald X^2	88.17***			82.63***		
Percent Correctly Predicted	61.73%			68.52%		
Proportionate Reduction of Error	4.92%			6.43%		

Significance at $p \leq .01$ (one-tailed predicted relationships) denoted by ***, and at $p \leq .05$ by **.
Significance at $p \leq .01$ (one-tailed relationships opposite of those predicted) denoted by †††, and at $p \leq .05$ by ††. Robust Standard Errors, Clustered by Year reported in parentheses.

Table 5.3: Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms from Models 15-16			
		House	Senate
		Simple Majority	Simple Majority
1-30 Days	Domestic/Political	-.2705	No Effect
	Foreign/Defense	.3091	No Effect
	Net Impact	**.0386**	No Effect
31-60 Days	Domestic/Political	No Effect	No Effect
	Foreign/Defense	No Effect	No Effect
	Net Impact	No Effect	No Effect
61-90 Days	Domestic/Political	No Effect	-.3101
	Foreign/Defense	No Effect	.6149
	Net Impact	No Effect	**.3048**

APPENDIX B

Table 6: Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data on OLS Models

	House		Senate	
Dependent Variables	Baseline	Interaction	Baseline	Interaction
Chamber as Whole (c)	0.993**	0.986***	0.988***	0.964***
President's Party (p)	0.974***	0.974***	0.989**	0.989**
Opposition Party (o)	0.983***	0.956***	0.992*	0.970***

Significance at $p \leq .01$ denoted by ***, at $p \leq .05$ by **, and $p \leq .10$ by *.
Reported values represent each model's "W" test statistic.

Table 6 presents the results for tests to determine whether or not OLS regression is an appropriate statistical method to use for my data. From the displayed results it is apparent that it is not appropriate to employ OLS regression. Using a Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data, I find that the "W" test statistic for each of model's error term is statistically significant from 0. This allows me to reject the null hypothesis that each model's error term is distributed normally. Failure to find normally distributed error terms means that all twelve models violate OLS regression's underlying assumption of *normality* (Gujerati 2004 pp. 337-339). Without meeting this assumption, I am unable to obtain efficient and consistent parameter estimates for my independent variables using OLS regression.

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